NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 94 | Number 4

Article 3

5-1-2016

Adaptive Discrimination
Elise C. Boddie

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1235 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

ADAPTIVE DISCRIMINATION*
ELISE C. BODDIE**
This Article critiques the assumption in constitutional law that
racial discrimination is siloed, static, and time limited. It argues
instead that discrimination is systemic, dynamic, and
intergenerational due to its adaptive nature. The Article sets forth
a theory of “adaptive discrimination”—that discrimination
adapts to law and to social norms prohibiting intentional
discrimination. This process begins with public and private
efforts to evade antidiscrimination law and persists through
vehicles of white privilege, racialized class ideologies, and
implicit biases that embed in facially race-neutral laws and
practices. These subtler racial processes continuously reproduce
and entrench racial disadvantage across our social landscapes.
By explaining how discrimination adapts over time, this theory
helps to account for the persistence of vast inequality, despite
formal racial progress under the law. Using cases across different
civil rights contexts as examples, the Article also identifies and
critiques time-centered assumptions in constitutional doctrine
that discrimination “expires,” which further obscure
discrimination’s adaptive qualities. The Article contends that the
Supreme Court has relied on these conceptions of time to justify
the termination of judicial and legislative remedies, allowing
discrimination to continue unchecked. It proposes changes to
constitutional law that would curb adaptive discrimination and
outlines a framework for an enforcement mechanism to match
discrimination’s endurance and dynamic complexity.
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“The better we know our racial past, the better we know our
racial present.”
—Joe R. Feagin1
INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A THEORY OF ADAPTIVE
DISCRIMINATION
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager,
was shot to death by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri.2
Brown’s killing, and the grand jury’s subsequent refusal to indict the
officer responsible for his death, sparked national outrage and
demonstrations across the country.3 Pundits and advocates alike saw
the incident as evidence of a pervasive problem of excessive use of
force by police against black males.4 In the investigative report that
followed the killing, the U.S. Department of Justice documented
extensive racial problems with the law enforcement practices of the
Ferguson Police Department.5
Yet disparities in policing are just one indicator of the racial
inequality spread throughout the St. Louis metropolitan area around

1. JOE R. FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME: CENTURIES OF
AND COUNTER-FRAMING 1 (2d ed. 2013).

RACIAL FRAMING

2. See Tracking the Events in the Wake of Michael Brown’s Shooting, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/09/us/10ferguson-michaelbrown-shooting-grand-jury-darren-wilson.html?_r=0#/#time354_10512
[https://perma.cc/J3W9-67UR].
3. See, e.g., John Eligon & Manny Fernandez, In Protests from Midwest to Both
Coasts, Fury Boils Over, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11
/25/us/frustration-months-in-the-making-boils-over-on-the-streets-of-ferguson.html
[https://perma.cc/UV7N-6P33]; David Dante Troutt, Is Racial Justice Possible in America?,
THE NATION (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/racial-justice-possibleamerica/ [https://perma.cc/5GSU-N7UT].
4. See, e.g., Branden Cobb, Recent Violent Confrontations Between Black Males and
Police, CBS NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/recent-violentconfrontations-between-Black-males-and-police/ [https://perma.cc/9CXF-H6SX]; Rebecca
Leber, Police Officers Are More Likely to Shoot Black Men, Studies Suggest, NEW
REPUBLIC (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119060/michael-brownstudies-show-racial-bias-police-shootings [https://perma.cc/PZB4-2LRX]; Nina Strochlic,
The 14 Teens Killed by Cops Since Michael Brown, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 25, 2014, 4:45
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/25/the-14-teens-killed-by-cops-sincemichael-brown.html [https://perma.cc/2LBW-EVDT].
5. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT], http://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police
_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ8L-LLLJ] (describing how law enforcement’s
“focus on revenue” rather than on “public safety needs” led to unconstitutional and
racially biased practices that fostered community distrust and resentment).
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Ferguson.6 Many accounts of the racial tragedy begin with Brown’s
fatal interaction with the police officer.7 But by widening our frame of
reference and extending it backwards in time, we can also situate
Brown’s death in a broader social context of longstanding, systemic,
and dynamic racial subordination.8 In so doing, we learn to appreciate
the fluidity of racial discrimination and the ways it morphs through
time across our social, economic, and political landscapes. We can
see, for instance, how racial disparities in Ferguson’s policing
practices relate to the city’s segregated schools and majority-white
municipal power structure, as well as to earlier episodes of housing
and employment discrimination throughout the greater St. Louis
metropolitan area.9 Though each of these problems has manifested in
6. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF
FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://www.epi.org
/files/2014/making-of-ferguson-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3HB-RQBZ] (describing the
multiple forms and sources of racial inequality in and around Ferguson). I am indebted to
Rothstein for his thorough analysis of racial discrimination in Ferguson and the
surrounding area.
7. See, e.g., Rachel Clarke & Christopher Lett, What Happened When Michael Brown
Met Officer Darren Wilson, CNN (Nov. 4, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive
/2014/08/us/ferguson-brown-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/8ATY-NSRB]; Laura Santhanam &
Vanessa Dennis, What Do the Newly Released Witness Statements Tell Us About the Michael
Brown Shooting?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 25, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour
/updates/newly-released-witness-testimony-tell-us-michael-brown-shooting/
[https://perma
.cc/GB22-WJLX]; Michael Schwirtz & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Experts Weigh Police Officer’s
Decisions Leading to Fatal Shooting of Teenager, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014, at A1; The
Michael Brown Shooting: The St. Louis Blues, ECONOMIST (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www
.economist.com/news/united-states/21612199-police-kill-unarmed-teenager-sparking-riots-stlouis-blues [https://perma.cc/4DD9-DCA7]. But see David Von Drehle, The Long, Tangled
Roots of the Michael Brown Shooting, TIME (Aug. 12, 2014), http://time.com/3104128
/michael-brown-ferguson-cop-shooting-protests/ [https://perma.cc/6686-BEPQ] (discussing
the history of Ferguson, including zoning laws and boundaries that bred racial inequality).
8. See infra Section I.B. I use the term “subordination” to refer to a process formed
through rules, behaviors, and norms that consistently drives the status quo to racial
inequality. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr. et al., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435, 2448
(2003) (distinguishing “discrimination” from “subordination”).
9. See infra Section I.B; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
307–08 (1977) (discussing elements of pattern and practice employment discrimination in
the hiring of black teachers in St. Louis County); DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 2, 9–15
(describing how revenue-generating pressures on local police and municipal courts led to
racially biased law enforcement practices); Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, the
Continuing Tragedy of Ferguson, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.propublica.org
/article/ferguson-school-segregation [https://perma.cc/W4DH-85C5]; Jeff Smith, Opinion,
Black Town, White Power, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/08/18/opinion/in-ferguson-black-town-white-power.html [https://perma.cc/YN4N-ULC2]
(describing racial dynamics that led to Ferguson’s “virtually all-white power structure”
despite its “majority-black” demographics, and discussing the “economic pressures that
inflame[d] racial tension” in Ferguson); Ferguson-Florissant School District Data
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different ways, at different times, and even in different places, this
Article contends that they are all part of a larger ecosystem of
discrimination.
Our limited cognitive abilities often lead us to miss these
relationships. Social science reveals that the conventional explanation
of the Ferguson shooting incident, as a problem of policing alone, is
typical of how we process complex information. Indeed, it is human
intuition to look for a linear story of cause and effect—a discrete
event that occurs at an identifiable moment—to explain an outcome.10
This intuition leads us to couch multifaceted racial problems in more
simplistic terms.11 By framing discrimination primarily as a problem of
specific individuals or institutional wrongdoing that manifests itself in
time-limited ways, law yields to these same impulses.12
This Article sets forth a theory of adaptive discrimination that
rejects constitutional law’s linear, time-centered interpretations of
racial discrimination. Its premise is that racial discrimination adapts to
the legal and social environment by mutating to evade prohibitions
against intentional discrimination.13 As it morphs to avoid legal and
social sanction it spreads across multiple domains.14 The Article
defines adaptive discrimination as consisting of public and private
actions and institutional rules and norms that synergistically

Collection, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2011), http://ocrdata.ed.gov
/Page?t=d&eid=27900&syk=6&pid=736 [https://perma.cc/KP3Y-94QF] (showing that the
Ferguson-Florissant School District was 77.1% African-American; 15.6% White; 2.3%
Hispanic; and 0.6% Asian). See generally Complaint, Mo. State Conference of the
NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 14-2077 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014)
(alleging voting discrimination as a result of the at-large election system in the FergusonFlorissant School District).
10. See John D. Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling: Tools for Learning in a
Complex World, 43 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 11 (2001) [hereinafter Sterman, System
Dynamics Modeling] (“Where the world is dynamic, evolving, and interconnected, we tend
to make decisions using mental models that are static, narrow, and reductionist.”).
11. See id. (describing individuals’ general tendency to adopt an “event-oriented,
reactionary approach to problem-solving”).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 21 (2010) (“Any candid observer of American racial
history must acknowledge that racism is highly adaptable. The rules and reasons the
political system employs to enforce status relations of any kind, including racial hierarchy,
evolve and change as they are challenged.”).
14. See Stephen M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 201, 213–14 (2014)
(“Race discrimination may be viewed as an interactive system spread across social
contexts, according to which inequality in one area, such as healthcare or education, fuels
discrimination in another, such as employment, housing or voting.”).
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regenerate racial inequality across social systems through time.15
These “systems,” which I refer to throughout this Article, set the
stage for racial tragedy, much like the fatal shooting of Michael
Brown.
Conceptualizing racial discrimination as adaptive—rather than as
piecemeal, static, and aberrational—allows us to see it for what it is: a
living, metastatic disease. Pinpointing the many sources of adaptive
discrimination, however, is difficult.16 This Article contends that it
begins with government entities, public and private organizations, and
individuals who skirt both laws prohibiting intentional discrimination
and the rules of socially acceptable17 conduct by reconstituting
discrimination in less overt forms.18 Once reconstituted,
discrimination persists through ostensibly race-neutral institutional
rules, laws, and behaviors19 that converge around norms of white
privilege,20 racialized class ideologies,21 and pervasive implicit racial
15. See infra Part I.
16. Cf. John A. Powell, Race and Class: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW &
INEQ. 355, 358 (2007) (contending that a “broader, richer understanding of race” should
look beyond “individual, intentional[, and] unconscious discrimination” to examine
“cultural meaning, institutional arrangements and their interactions”).
17. See infra Part I; FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 89 (“Psychological research has found
that many white respondents alter comments on racial issues to appear unprejudiced.”);
see also Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“Discrimination continues to pollute the social and economic mainstream of American
life, and is often simply masked in more subtle forms. It has become easier to coat various
forms of discrimination with the appearance of propriety, or to ascribe some other less
odious intention to what is in reality discriminatory behavior. In other words, while
discriminatory conduct persists, violators have learned not to leave the proverbial
‘smoking gun’ behind.”); Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987)
(“Defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus
[nor] leave a paper trail demonstrating it.”).
18. The dynamics of adaptive discrimination are similar to what Reva Siegel has
described as “preservation-through-transformation[,]” in which “[e]fforts to reform a
status regime bring about changes in its rule structure and justificatory rhetoric.” Reva
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).
19. See generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY
CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014) (describing the facially race-neutral social,
economic, and political processes that reproduce white advantage across generations);
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1849–57 (1994) (explaining the role that jurisdictional
boundaries play in perpetuating racial inequality).
20. Cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1659, 1661 (1995) [hereinafter Mahoney, Segregation] (“The construction of race
in America today allows whiteness to remain a dominant background norm, associated
with positive qualities, for white people, and it allows unemployment and
underemployment to seem like natural features of black communities.”).
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bias.22 These dynamics—which are a function both of discrimination
that we typically associate with racial “intent” and the passive
reinforcement of its discriminatory effects—create an equilibrium of
inequality that continues to deny African Americans, in particular,
opportunity, status, and power as a group.23
Understanding racial discrimination as a complex, adaptive
system—rather than as aberrational or as a historical artifact
unconnected to present disadvantage—alerts us to its
multidimensionality
and
persistence
across
generations.24
Appreciating the role that adaptive discrimination plays in structuring
choices and opportunities also reduces incentives to blame the
individuals who are trapped by such systems and to focus instead on
addressing racial harms.
This Article uses the term “discrimination” to include behavior
that we conventionally define in terms of racial “intent” and to
encompass facially race-neutral policies that generate adverse racial
effects. However, neither of these concepts, under existing
antidiscrimination law, either alone or together, captures adaptive
discrimination’s multifaceted nature.25 Intent doctrine focuses on
21. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race,
Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003) [hereinafter
Mahoney, Class and Status] (examining the complex relationship between race and class).
22. See infra Part II.
23. Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois predicted the persistence of racial inequality when he
observed in 1903 that the “color-line” would be the “problem of the Twentieth Century.”
W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES, at vii
(1903). I focus most of my observations in this Article on the experiences of African
Americans, the racial group most conventionally identified with racial subordination. See
Derrick Bell, Racism Is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 HOW. L.J. 79, 79 (1991) (asserting
that “[b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country”); cf. FEAGIN, supra note
1, at 101 (observing that racially subordinating practices tend to be more focused on blacks
than other people of color). William Julius Wilson prominently argued that class, rather
than race, accounts for the most persistent disadvantage among African Americans.
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 112–18, 146–49 (1987). But see Powell, supra note 16,
at 858 (arguing “that race and class are distinct and at the same time mutually constitutive,
recursive processes in the United States that render race and class radically incoherent
without understanding their interactive nature”).
24. See Siegel, supra note 18, at 1111 (“Once we recognize that the rules and reasons
the legal system employs to enforce status relations evolve as they are contested, we ought
to scrutinize justifications for facially neutral state action with skepticism, knowing that we
may be rationalizing practices that perpetuate historic forms of stratification, much as
Plessy v. Ferguson once did.”).
25. Cf. FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 3 (“Much recent research on racial matters continues
to emphasize the prejudice and bias terminology and approach in assessing what are often
termed racial ‘disparities’ . . . . These concepts, although certainly useful, are far from

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

1242

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

discrimination, typically thought to result from racial animus,26
against identifiable persons or groups. Disparate impact addresses
policies and practices that perpetuate group-based inequality.27 But
because it primarily reaches discrimination that is specific to a
particular institution,28 it too obscures the connective relationships
and dynamic interactions that reproduce racial disadvantage across
our social landscape.29
Whatever the statutory limitations of disparate impact under
federal civil rights law, however, constitutional law is far worse. Equal
protection precludes discrimination claims based on impact alone,30
narrowly defines intent,31 and embraces colorblind rationales that
focus on the presumed harms of racial classifications, rather than on
the harms of racial subordination.32 Thus, equal protection serves only

sufficient to assess and explain the foundational and systemic racism of the United
States.”); George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 117
(1995) (arguing that “the concept of discrimination is at least incomplete and probably
insufficient to remedy persistent forms of inequality in the workplace”).
26. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (requiring specific intent);
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (concluding that “intent” refers to
conduct taken “because of” and not merely “in spite of” a protected characteristic). But
see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624–26 (1982) (concluding that awareness of adverse
outcomes was sufficient to invalidate a facially neutral state law that effectively
disfranchised black voters); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977) (advancing an
effects standard in the context of grand jury selection).
27. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 499 (2003) (noting disparate impact’s implicit focus on “historically
embedded hierarchies” and group inequality); Rich, supra note 14, at 230 (“Disparateimpact theory distributes liability on a structural basis, examining the interaction between
facially neutral conduct and racially identifiable external factors . . . .”).
28. See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact
Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1561 (2004) (observing that “the plaintiff
normally has the burden of identifying the specific practice she claims is posing a barrier to
her group”).
29. See infra Section II.A.2.
30. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). But see generally Sheila Foster,
Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998) (discussing the complexity of intent
doctrine and rebuffing notions that intent operates according to one standard).
31. See Foster, supra note 30, at 1079–82 (discussing Castaneda and different
permutations of the intent standard that allow an inference of intent based on adverse
racial impact); Primus, supra note 27, at 536; see also, e.g., cases cited supra note 26. See
generally David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 956–65 (1989) (discussing different conceptions of intent).
32. See infra Section II.A; see also Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1363 (2010) (describing colorblindness “as the guiding value of
equal protection”).
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to redress discrete, individualized discrimination—systemic racial
inequality is taken as a given.33
Worse still, constitutional law facilitates adaptive discrimination
by limiting the power of the federal courts and of Congress to
dismantle racial discrimination that manifests over time.34 For
example, the Court has limited the equitable authority of district
courts to retain jurisdiction over school desegregation cases where
school districts demonstrate that they have sought in “good faith” to
eliminate the vestiges of their prior discrimination to a “practicable”
extent.35 The Court also disabled a key provision of the federal
Voting Rights Act that curbed discriminatory practices in
jurisdictions with a longstanding history of racial discrimination.36
These cases insulate segregation in public schools from judicial review
and protect voting practices that effectively exclude minority voters
from the democratic process.37 As a result, public schools in the South
have become increasingly racially segregated38 and state and local
elections have been distorted by lack of minority participation.39 In
short, constitutional law embraces rules that embed discriminatory
outcomes, with consequential results.40
Some of these doctrinal choices can be explained by concerns
about the judiciary’s constitutional authority and institutional
competence to manage the social forces that extend beyond specific
33. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.) (rejecting “societal discrimination” as a constitutional justification for
affirmative action).
34. See infra Section II.C; see also Siegel, supra note 18, at 1111 (“Once we recognize
that the rules and reasons the legal system employs to enforce status relations evolve as
they are contested, we ought to scrutinize justifications for facially neutral state action
with skepticism, knowing that we may be rationalizing practices that perpetuate historic
forms of stratification, much as Plessy v. Ferguson once did.”).
35. See infra Section II.C.2.
36. See infra Section II.C.2.
37. See infra Section II.C.2.
38. See Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era for Desegregation, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
423, 431 (2012) (observing that many public schools have resegregated in the wake of the
Court’s decisions in the early 1990s limiting the power of the federal judiciary in school
desegregation cases).
39. See infra Section I.A.1.
40. Although I do not explore it in any depth here, I concede that statutory law may
be more useful for challenging practices that marginalize people of color due to the
availability of disparate impact claims against policies and practices that have a
disproportionate, adverse racial effect. However, even these claims demand that plaintiffs
identify a causal connection between the challenged practice and the discriminatory effect.
See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2514 (2015).
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conduct in discrete cases.41 Institutional deference to state legislative
processes also partly explains these outcomes.42 Other choices, such as
the Court’s decisions to strike down race-specific affirmative action
policies that target pervasive racial inequality, can be attributed to
colorblindness rationales in equal protection doctrine.43
This Article points to another explanation for the Court’s
constrained constitutional interpretations and the deeply flawed
accounts of racial discrimination that undergird them. It traces the
Court’s decisions to assumptions that discrimination ceases with the
passage of time—in other words, that it expires, rather than adapts.
Our human tendency is to favor simplistic solutions to multifaceted
problems and then to judge the success (or failure) of these solutions
prematurely.44 In so doing, we overlook the problem of time lags
between the implementation of a remedy and the realization of its
objective.45 Because judges naturally are susceptible to the same
human instincts, they too are captive to linear thinking. The Court’s
emphasis on time drives its conclusions that discrimination no longer
exists at all or that it no longer exists in a form that merits
constitutional remedy.46 These time-centered notions blind the Court
to the complex operations that constitute systemic racial
discrimination, leading it to terminate judicial and legislative

41. See Rich, supra note 14, at 218–20 (discussing the Court’s decision in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1975), which limited equal protection claims to proof of
discriminatory purpose due to concerns about the federal judiciary’s institutional capacity
to manage broader claims and to safeguard separation of powers).
42. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 136 (1980); Paul Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 127–28 [hereinafter Brest, Legislative Motive]; Paul Brest,
Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1978) [hereinafter Brest,
Reflections] (“If the motives underlying an administrative or a legislative enactment
should be insulated from judicial review, it must be for institutional rather than
jurisprudential reasons.”).
43. See infra Section II.A.4.
44. See John D. Sterman, Communicating Climate Change Risks in a Skeptical World,
108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 811, 816–18 (2011) [hereinafter Sterman, Climate Change]
(discussing how misconceptions of time can lead to miscalculations when designing
remedies).
45. Cf. Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 12 tbl.2 (“In complex
systems cause and effect are distant in time and space while we tend to look for causes
near the events we seek to explain. Our attention is drawn to the symptoms of difficulty
rather than the underlying cause. High leverage policies are not obvious.”).
46. See infra Section II.C.
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remedies for discrimination that the Justices perceive (erroneously)
as long since past.47
These conceptions of time have long been at the center of the
Court’s constitutional race jurisprudence, although they have
surfaced in some cases more explicitly than others. The Court’s use of
time extends as far back as its decision in the Civil Rights Cases,48
which invalidated federal antidiscrimination legislation, declaring its
impatience with civil rights measures less than two decades after the
Civil War and the formal end of slavery.49 The Court’s focus on time
has also led it to reject “societal discrimination” as a justification for
voluntary affirmative action policies.50
As mentioned earlier, the Court in more recent decades has
invoked concerns about the length of time that local school districts
have been subject to court supervision as a basis for ending judicial
remedies for school desegregation. And it extended similar reasoning
to Congress’s Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment in
Shelby County v. Holder51 when it disabled a core provision of the
Voting Rights Act.52 The Court objected that the provision—which
required jurisdictions with a record of discrimination to pre-clear
voting changes with the federal government—was outdated, as it had
operated pursuant to the same formula for nearly fifty years.53 This
Article contends that the Court’s preoccupation with time primed its
conclusion that the formula no longer captured constitutionally
cognizable discrimination and that the provision’s continuing
intrusion on state sovereignty therefore exceeded congressional
power.54
All of this raises the obvious question of what we can possibly do
about racial discrimination given its multidimensionality. Returning
to the tragic story in the beginning of this Article, one may wonder
47. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Court ignores that ‘what’s past is prologue.’ And ‘[t]hose who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ Congress was especially mindful of the
need to reinforce the gains already made and to prevent backsliding.” (internal citations
omitted) (first quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1; and then
quoting 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905))).
48. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
49. Id. at 24; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 917, 922 (2009) (describing the Court’s early impatience with race-based remedies).
50. See Hutchinson, supra note 49, at 922.
51. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
52. Id. at 2631.
53. Id. at 2625–31.
54. Id. at 2631.
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how an adaptive understanding helps to prevent or redress the fatal
shooting of an unarmed black teenager by a police officer.
Institutional reform of policing practices is an essential and vital
concern, and I do not intend in any way to diminish its significance
here. The precepts of adaptive discrimination, however, also urge us
to explore discrimination’s broader dimensions. They suggest that we
shift from a singular, transaction-based notion of racial discrimination
as a form of individual bias, prejudice, and intolerance, and train
additional attention on the sources and persistence of systemic
disadvantage.55 Therefore, while we need to dismantle discriminatory
policing practices, we need also to find ways to eliminate the
underlying systems that dehumanize black life and create the
overarching context for fatal encounters like Michael Brown’s.
In sum, adaptive discrimination enables a more complete
diagnosis of racial discrimination and encourages us to tackle its full
dimensions. In so doing, it helps us to reconcile the obvious
disconnect between formal racial progress, on the one hand—as a
result of laws that bar intentional discrimination—and the stubborn
persistence of vast racial inequality on the other.56 It explains how we
can elect an African-American president and yet still experience
voter suppression57 and disproportionately high unemployment,58

55. Cf. FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 2–5 (“Traditional approaches do not capture or
explain the structural realities of this society’s racial oppression in the past or present.”).
56. See Gary Younge, Editorial, The Awkward Truth About Race, THE NATION, June
9, 2014, at 10 (“[W]hen it comes to the goals laid down by the civil rights movement . . .,
America is actually going backward. Schools are resegregating, legislation is being gutted,
it’s getting harder to vote, large numbers are being deprived of their basic rights through
incarceration, and the economic disparities between black and white are growing. In many
areas, America is becoming more separate and less equal.”).
57. See Ian Vandewalker & Keith Gunnar Bentele, Vulnerability in Numbers: Racial
Composition of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights Act, 18 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 99, 101–02 (2015); Christopher Ingraham, New Evidence that Voter ID
Laws ‘Skew Democracy’ in Favor of White Republicans, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb.
4, 2016) (citing Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi & Lindsay Nielson, Voter Identification
Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes (forthcoming 2016), http://pages.ucsd.edu
/~zhajnal/page5/documents/VoterIDLawsandtheSuppressionofMinorityVoters1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3Q9-N68T]), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02
/04/new-evidence-that-voter-id-laws-skew-democracy-in-favor-of-white-republicans/
[https://perma.cc/R6LZ-AGES] (discussing the findings of a forthcoming study conducted
by political scientists at the University of California, San Diego and Bucknell University
exploring the impact that recently enacted voter identification laws are having on minority
voting).
58. See Gillian B. White, Education Gaps Don’t Fully Explain Why Black
Unemployment Is So High, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com
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segregation in public schools and housing,59 and significant bias in our
criminal justice system.60 An adaptive framework enables us to see
that racial progress is not inevitable but rather that it ebbs and flows
through time.
There is an obvious danger, of course, that we may be easily
overwhelmed both by the complexity and density of the problem and
the call to respond with solutions that match its persistence and
intensity. We might choose instead to resign ourselves to hopelessness
and despair. And yet, understanding racial discrimination as an
adaptive problem can also be liberating. It suggests that we need
not—and, indeed, should not—focus on the search for one magical
approach, but rather should pursue a broad range of coordinated
strategies. For purposes of law, this means that we should not rely on
courts alone, but should look to legislatures and communities to
create an ecosystem of sustained racial equality and freedom. This
effort would require some meaningful changes in constitutional law,
which, as it stands now, prevents courts, legislatures, and other public
institutions from fully capitalizing on their institutional and
organizational capacities. As I explore a bit further, however, other
parts of this project could be pursued at the state and local level,
relatively free of these constitutional constraints.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I is divided into two
sections. Section I.A defines adaptive discrimination and locates it in
public and private efforts to evade various civil rights mandates. It
then explores how a confluence of white privilege, racialized class
ideologies, and implicit bias embed in our institutions and structures,
producing a continuum of racial inequality that spans generations.
Whites’ ability to exit antidiscrimination regimes, coupled with the
lack of agency that people of color themselves have over
subordinating systems and law’s assumptions that discrimination
naturally ceases to exist over time, further exacerbate the problem.
Section I.B gives a concrete account of adaptive discrimination by
connecting intergenerational discrimination in St. Louis County to

/business/archive/2015/12/black-white-unemployment-gap/421497/ [https://perma.cc/X4LUJP3C].
59. See Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Public Decisions and Private
Choices: Reassessing the School-Housing Segregation Link in the Post-Parents Involved
Era, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 414–15 (2013) (noting the role that private interests
play in segregating neighborhoods and schools).
60. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 15–89.
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present-day discrimination in Ferguson, Missouri, where the fatal
shooting discussed in this Article’s opening paragraphs occurred.
Part II explores the problem of time in constitutional doctrine
and how it subverts an adaptive understanding of racial
discrimination. Part III proposes changes to constitutional law that
would free federal courts and Congress to craft strategies for curbing
adaptive discrimination. This Article concludes by outlining an
interactive, community-based enforcement mechanism that might
generate more sustainable change. Ultimately, I am hopeful that law
can address this problem, but it will require different, more
innovative structures than those that we have now.
I. WHAT IS ADAPTIVE DISCRIMINATION?
A. The Elements of Adaptive Discrimination: Systemic, Dynamic,
Regenerative
Adaptive discrimination consists of public and private actions
and institutional rules and norms that synergistically regenerate racial
inequality across social systems through time. This Section explores
racial discrimination’s historically cyclical nature: formal bans on
intentional discrimination are followed by episodic retrenchment as
discrimination is reconstituted in race-neutral forms that more readily
escape legal sanction, thus allowing the cycle to start anew.
It is hard to peg this dynamic to a single ideology. Neither racism
nor white supremacy—as conscious belief systems motivated by racial
animus—fully captures the dynamic I describe here, though I contend
that such beliefs have been instrumental to adaptive discrimination.
That said, society appears to tolerate significant racial inequality,61
even as it formally rejects overt racism. We can attribute some of this
problem to a constellation of laws, rules, and practices that converge
around white privilege norms62 and racialized class ideologies.63 Flying
below law’s radar, these disguised racial practices and belief systems
become embedded in our social, economic, and political organizations
61. Glenn C. Loury, Social Exclusion and Ethnic Groups: The Challenge to
Economics, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
1999, at 225, 233, 255 (2000).
62. Cf. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1661 (“The construction of race in
America today allows whiteness to remain a dominant background norm, associated with
positive qualities, for white people, and it allows unemployment and underemployment to
seem like natural features of black communities.”).
63. See Mahoney, Class and Status, supra note 21, at 799, 828–29 (discussing a
“dynamic view of class, race, and struggle”).
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and institutions, producing an equilibrium of lasting racial
disadvantage.64 A growing body of social science indicates that
pervasive unconscious bias may also help to explain our high
tolerance for vast racial disparities.65
The following sections unpack these points further. Below I
describe historical examples of evasive strategies that emerged in
response to antidiscrimination laws. I then discuss how ostensibly
race-neutral belief systems and whites’ ability to exit
antidiscrimination regimes perpetuate racial subordination across this
inherited social landscape.
1. Historical Examples of Evasive Strategies
It may be easy to forget that for a brief but critical period in our
history blacks enjoyed a significant measure of freedom. During
Reconstruction, following the Civil War, blacks sought to establish
their autonomy by assuming control of churches, schools, and
“benevolent societies,” by “staking a claim to economic
independence,” and by forging their own “distinctive political
culture[.]”66 Some blacks achieved prominent political status during
this time67 and, through significant mobilization, began to “demand[]
the full gamut of opportunities and privileges enjoyed by whites.”68
But this period did not last long. New forms of discrimination
took hold as government officials, in concert with private actors,
sought to avoid equality mandates.69 The Supreme Court sanctioned
64. I intend to distinguish the dynamics described here from “path-dependen[t]”
behavior in which “an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the
historical path leading to it.” Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604
(2001).
65. See generally Sheryll Cashin, Shall We Overcome? “Post-Racialism” and Inclusion
in the 21st Century, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 31, 34–37, 45–46 (2011) (discussing the
role that implicit biases play in political opposition to integration and policies that
promote racial equality).
66. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, at 78 (1988).
67. Id. at 112–13.
68. Id. at 113.
69. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–43 (1968); see also
DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 6 (2008) (describing
laws and practices that reenslaved African Americans for several decades following
Reconstruction). The Court reasoned in Jones that
[j]ust as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise
of those rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes
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the resulting laws and practices through early decisions that gutted
the Reconstruction Amendments.70
For instance, in United States v. Cruikshank,71 the Court cleared a
path for whites to use violence and intimidation against black
majorities in the South.72 The decision enabled whites to seize control
of state and local governments in order to protect their class interests
as southern planters.73 In Cruikshank’s wake, state and local
legislatures passed laws that imposed stringent racial controls on
black populations.74 Southern states also established peonage systems
that delivered an estimated 100,000 blacks, charged with
manufactured “crimes,” into forced labor camps under shockingly
brutal conditions.75 These harsh and inhumane systems—fostered
through partnerships between law enforcement and private citizens—
continued well into the twentieth century.76 Thus, for approximately
fifty years following the Civil War, government officials and private
actors together effectively reconstituted slavery, which had been
formally abolished and constitutionally outlawed by the Thirteenth
Amendment.77
Whites devised other methods for perpetuating racial caste,
despite the Reconstruction Amendments’ formal guarantee of racial
from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when
racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 441–43.
70. Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (2010)
(“The Supreme Court . . . limit[ed] not only the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments
but also Congress’s powers to enforce them in decisions like United States v. Cruikshank
and [the] Civil Rights Cases.”).
71. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
72. Id. at 556–57 (striking indictments of whites who were convicted under the 1870
Enforcement Act for conspiring to intimidate African Americans through murder and
racial terror).
73. See James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank
(1876) Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 385, 388–89 (2014).
74. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 85 (1997) (observing that
Black Codes were “[i]ntended to minimize the consequences of the abolition of slavery”).
75. See BLACKMON, supra note 69, at 7–8 (describing widespread “quasi-slavery” in
the twentieth-century South and observing that “the total number of workers caught in
this net had to have totaled more than a hundred thousand and perhaps more than twice
that figure”); see also Pope, supra note 73, at 446.
76. See BLACKMON, supra note 69, at 5 (noting “how a form of American slavery
persisted into the twentieth century, embraced by the U.S. economic system and abided at
all levels of government”).
77. Id. at 7.
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equality. These methods most notably included Jim Crow laws that
segregated blacks across almost every conceivable geographic and
spatial dimension.78 The Supreme Court’s notorious decision in Plessy
v. Ferguson,79 which held that state-mandated segregation did not
violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,80 bolstered
these laws.81 Racial subordination continued to deepen in the latter
part of the nineteenth century.82 Although constitutional protections
for African Americans existed in theory, Cruikshank, Plessy, and
other cases placed these subordinating practices beyond law’s reach.83
Thus, the constitutional order itself adapted to accommodate racist
practices.84
Constitutional law shifted notably in Brown v. Board of
Education,85 which struck down de jure segregation in public
education.86 However, southern officials soon organized a campaign
of concerted resistance.87 In Prince Edward County, Virginia, for
78. See Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 425–34 (2010).
79. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overturned by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. Id. at 550–51.
81. See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 391 (“Even if
Plessy did not provide a crucial green flag to the spread of racial segregation, one could
argue that it legitimized the practice and thus delayed its eventual destruction. On this
view, Plessy taught the nation that racial segregation comported with the Constitution and
therefore, implicitly, was not immoral.”).
82. Id. at 309 (describing the subordination of blacks in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, including an increase in lynching, black disenfranchisement through
literacy tests and poll taxes, the virtual disappearance of integration, the increase in racial
disparities in public education, the exclusion of blacks from juries, and the enactment of
“restrictive labor control measures” designed to “coerc[e] black agricultural labor”).
83. Indeed, the Plessy Court attributed any inferences of black inferiority to
misguided assumptions on the part of the “colored race.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (“We
consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that
the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction on it.”).
84. See generally Klarman, supra note 81, at 306 (arguing that the Court’s Plessy-era
decisions reflected both popular opinion and the Justices’ personal views).
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. Id. at 494–95.
87. See Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 24 (1992) (describing various kinds of “resistance,” viz., “passive
resistance,” “massive resistance,” and “violent resistance”—all characterizing efforts to
evade Brown’s mandate—and observing that in the aftermath of Brown “some school
boards developed elaborate schemes of student assignment in which race was not an
explicit ground of decision, but which effectively delayed desegregation for years”); see
also, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (asserting that the constitutional right
against racial discrimination “can neither be nullified openly and directly by state
legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through
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example, local officials flouted Brown by closing public schools and
funding private, white educational academies with public funds.88
Districts also adopted formally race-neutral “freedom of choice”
plans that allowed blacks and whites to select the schools they wanted
to attend—a strategy that, in the grip of whites’ continuing
commitments to segregation, was guaranteed to preserve racially
isolated schools in the South.89 Both southern and northern school
districts also resorted to residence laws that zoned students to schools
in the racially segregated neighborhoods where they lived.90 Thus,
despite Brown’s extension of formal constitutional protections, these
mechanisms entrenched segregation in public education.91
Government officials used other assorted tactics to circumvent
integration mandates in the decades after Brown, including efforts to
preserve residential segregation. One practice was to adopt facially

evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’ ”
(quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940))).
88. See Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964) (discussing the use of public
funds to support all-white private schools); see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1088 (1978) (“The facts of [Griffin] make clear
that the county intended to maintain a segregated system of public education, attempting
to insulate the program from constitutional scrutiny by disguising it in an ostensibly
private form.”). In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014), parents of black public school
children sought to require the IRS to enforce its nondiscrimination mandate against taxexempt private schools. Id. at 766 (holding that “respondents’ complaint, which aims at
nationwide relief and does not challenge particular identified unlawful IRS actions, alleges
no connection between the asserted desegregation injury and the challenged IRS conduct
direct enough to overcome the substantial separation of powers barriers to a suit seeking
an injunction to reform administrative procedures”); see also Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of
Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68 VAND. L. REV. 297, 349–50 (2015).
89. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440–42 (1968) (striking down a “freedom
of choice” plan).
90. See MEYER WEINBERG, RACE AND PLACE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL 42–53 (1967) (discussing the racial gerrymandering of
attendance zones to perpetuate school segregation); John Leubsdorf, Completing the
Desegregation Remedy, 57 B.U. L. REV. 39, 45 (1977) (discussing the practice of resorting
to neighborhood schools to evade desegregation). This strategy persisted decades after
Brown and in the North as well. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 269 n.1 (1977)
(describing the “use of optional attendance zones, racially based transportation of
schoolchildren, improper creation and alteration of attendance zones, grade structures,
and feeder school patterns” by the Detroit School Board); City of Yonkers v. U.S. Dep’t
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 837 F.2d 1181, 1235 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that a
neighborhood-school policy constituted intentional racial discrimination).
91. See DAVID DANTE TROUTT, THE PRICE OF PARADISE: THE COSTS OF
INEQUALITY AND A VISION FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AMERICA 105 (2013) [hereinafter
PRICE OF PARADISE].
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race-neutral zoning laws that effectively precluded affordable housing
for low-income minorities.92 In Chicago, city officials blocked racially
integrated units by refusing to adhere to land-use procedures that
were required for new construction.93 Another tactic was to
manipulate public transportation so that it bypassed routes likely to
bring racial minorities into white neighborhoods.94 In addition, local
officials extended their efforts to preserve segregation in government
services. In Palmer v. Thompson,95 for instance, the Supreme Court
upheld a town’s decision to close its public pools after segregation in
municipal facilities was declared unconstitutional.96 The town
conceded that an earlier desegregation order had motivated its initial
decision, but insisted that safety and economic concerns about
integrated pools justified its refusal to reopen them.97
In the employment arena, employers resorted to various
adaptive strategies shortly after civil rights laws banned intentional
discrimination. These strategies included “intelligence and
comprehension” tests as screening devices for both hiring and
promotion.98 These measures did not openly discriminate on the basis
92. See generally Josh Whitehead, Note, Using Disparate Impact to Strike Down
Exclusionary Zoning Codes, 33 REAL EST. L.J. 359 (2005) (describing the pervasive use of
zoning codes that have a racially exclusionary impact).
93. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1974)
(observing that district court orders mandating affirmative remedies for intentional
housing segregation were “ignored and frustrated” over an “eight year tortuous course”
and describing a certain “callousness” of the defendants “towards the rights of the black,
underprivileged citizens of Chicago that is beyond comprehension”); cf. Spallone v.
United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279–80 (1990) (imposing sanctions on the City of Yonkers for
its refusal to pass an ordinance that would allow affordable housing to be sited outside
predominantly minority areas).
94. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27–30. But cf. Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp.
421, 444 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (concluding that the alleged use of transportation schemes to
promote residential segregation was a cognizable litigation theory), dismissed, 592 F.2d
493 (8th Cir. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
95. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
96. Id. at 226–27.
97. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 97.
98. See David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
67 VAND. L. REV. 197, 212–13 (2014) (explaining that, according to civil rights attorneys at
the time, “intelligence tests and seniority provisions were ‘the most frequently used means
of discrimination against minority-group workers’ ”); cf., e.g., Sandra F. Sperino,
Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 82 (2011) (“In the first decades
after Title VII’s enactment, the courts were constantly considering how to shape the law to
handle new understandings of how discrimination occurs. Since the late 1980s, however,
the courts have appeared reluctant to adapt discrimination law, despite a growing
literature suggesting a more complex view of discrimination and its motivations, as well as
changes occurring in the workplace.”).
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of race. However, as the Supreme Court recognized in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,99 they achieved the same discriminatory impact, given the
severe historical deficits in blacks’ educational opportunities.100
Employers also continued to rely on seniority systems that froze in
place the effects of prior facial discrimination, leading one judge to
observe that “[j]ob seniority, embodying as it does, the racially
determined effects of a biased past, constitutes a form of present
racial discrimination.”101
Adaptive discrimination also persisted in voting.102 Government
officials for generations have resorted to “ingenious” schemes for
disfranchising racial minorities.103 After laws were enacted that barred
intentional discrimination, state and local officials concocted new
methods, such as at-large voting and annexation strategies, to weaken
minority voting power.104 Indeed, the problem was so persistent that
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which included a
provision requiring jurisdictions with a history of repeated racial
discrimination to pre-clear any voting changes with the federal
government.105 Examples of adaptive discrimination in voting
occurred in the wake of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections that
led to the election and reelection of President Obama. Following
99. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
100. See id. at 426–28 (discussing the shift from overtly discriminatory policy just “prior
to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” to a new policy after the
effective date for new hires); id. at 428 (“Neither [of the tests] was directed or intended to
measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs.”). Following
the enactment of the 1964 Act and the EEOC complaint that gave rise to the litigation,
Duke Power continued to maintain segregation at its plant. See Garrow, supra note 98, at
208–09 (describing the segregative practices and the failure of plant employees to
cooperate with the EEOC investigation).
101. See Garrow, supra note 98, at 214. Although some judges recognized these
“freezing effect[s]” as intentional discrimination, they eventually retreated and began to
couch them in terms of racial impact. Id. at 215 n.109 (describing one Fifth Circuit judge’s
apparent shift from describing the “freezing effect” as a form of intentional discrimination
to “tellingly eliminat[ing] any invocation of purpose” when he described such effects in a
later opinion). But see In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Emp’t Litig., 20 F.3d
1525, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding affirmative action plan on the remedial theory that
past hiring practices had produced an “adverse impact on blacks”).
102. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (observing that constitutional rights
alone will not protect African Americans from “the great mass of the white population
[that] intends to keep the blacks from voting”).
103. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966), abrogated by Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 91–92 (rev. ed. 2009);
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1–27 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989).
104. See infra Part II.
105. See infra Part II.
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these elections, Republican-leaning states passed laws requiring
photo identification in order to vote,106 with the purpose in some cases
of preventing racial minorities,107 among other Democratic-leaning
constituencies, such as college students, from participating in the
democratic process.108
The criminal justice system has also undermined civil rights
successes and racial justice reforms.109 For example, as the civil rights
movement gained ground during the 1960s, police throughout the
country began to target law enforcement efforts at inner-city blacks.110
By 1967, the practice of stopping and frisking blacks “had become
such a pervasive experience” that the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice publicly warned

106. See Editorial, North Carolina’s Voting Law Goes on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2015, at A26 (describing the state’s voter identification law as “a pile of blatantly
discriminatory measures that lawmakers knew would make voting harder, if not
impossible, for many lower-income citizens—who are disproportionately black and
Latino, and many of whom tend to vote Democratic”); Voter ID History, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter
-id-history.aspx [http://perma.cc/5VA3-8WEF].
107. See Deuel Ross, Pouring Old Poison into New Bottles: How Discretion and the
Discriminatory Administration of Voter ID Laws Recreate Literacy Tests, 45 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 362, 380 (2014) (“Most tellingly, officials who supported voter ID laws
or laws restricting early voting as purported anti-fraud measures recently either admitted
that these laws in fact served racially discriminatory purposes or were exposed as
purposefully callous to the laws’ discriminatory effects.”).
108. See Albert R. Hunt, The Battle to Protect Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/us/politics/the-battle-to-protect-voting-rights
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2L38-W7FM]; see also Ingraham, supra note 57 (citing Hajnal
et al., supra note 57) (observing that “[m]ost of the strictest ID laws” were passed after the
2008 elections and discussing forthcoming political science scholarship by researchers at
the University of California, San Diego and Bucknell University that identifies
“ ‘substantial drops in turnout for minorities” under these laws, even when controlling for
other factors).
109. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7–8, 21 (contending that the criminal justice
system emerged as another form of “social control” to replace the newly retired systems of
overt discrimination); see also Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1026
(2010) (“Sociologists and political scientists have recently persuasively argued that the rise
of mass imprisonment reflects a backlash against the civil rights movement.”); cf.
KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 76–135 (discussing the history of discriminatory law
enforcement against blacks from slavery through the modern era).
110. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7 (observing that incarceration rates
“quadrupled” between 1960 and 1990); see also Donna Murch, Ferguson’s Inheritance,
JACOBIN MAG. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/ferguson-policeblack-lives-matter/ [https://perma.cc/83LN-PB2B] (observing that heavy-handed policing
strategies emerged in response to radical black activism during the late 1960s and early
1970s).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

1256

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

about the consequences of these “aggressive” patrol tactics.111
Hostility between the police and black residents soon escalated and
was “the precipitating factor” in several major urban riots.112
The rise of mass incarceration further eroded civil rights progress
by destabilizing urban communities. The “war on drugs” ensnared
countless African Americans in the criminal justice system at
significantly higher rates than whites,113 at a time when drug crimes as
a whole were declining.114 Felon disfranchisement laws and, in some
states, the use of gerrymandering techniques that treat prisoners as
residents of the prison’s jurisdiction, rather than as residents of their
home communities, continue to undermine African Americans’
political power and leverage.115
In sum, across the civil rights spectrum new policies and practices
have emerged in place of conventionally racist practices now barred
by law. Public officials and private actors have skirted social norms
condemning outright discrimination and have adopted new rules that
in effect, and by design, reconstitute old patterns of racial
subordination. The breadth of the problem—which runs the
institutional gamut, from education and employment to housing,
voting, and criminal justice—shows how private and public conduct
feed and reinforce adaptive discrimination across a vast and
interconnected social system. These practices are both dynamic, as
111. Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423,
460–61 n.152 (2004); see also Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir.)
(discussing police practices of targeting black neighborhoods), aff’d on reh'g, 623 F.3d 990,
993–94 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam).
112. See Katz, supra note 111, at 436–37 n.77 (“Hostility between blacks and police was
a major factor—indeed, sometimes the precipitating factor—in several [urban] riots [of the
1960s].”).
113. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7 (“In some states, Black men have been
admitted to prison on drug charges at rates twenty to fifty times greater than those of
White men.”). Studies discredit the notion that the sale and use of drugs explains the
outcome. Id.; see also, e.g., 1 LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NIH PUB. NO. 07-6205, MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY
RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975–2006, at 32 (2007), http://www.namonitoringthefuture.org
/pubs/monographs/vol1_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAK4-QMTF] (“African-American
12th graders have consistently shown lower usage rates than White 12th graders for most
drugs, both licit and illicit.”).
114. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7.
115. See id. at 6 (discussing racial dimensions of mass incarceration); see also Little v.
LATFOR, No. 2310/2011, at 8–10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011) (upholding a New York
prison-based gerrymandering scheme as constitutional); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, The
Ironic Promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for Offender Anti-Discrimination Law, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1148–49 (2013) (discussing the “cumulative ramifications
of discrimination” against ex-offenders).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

2016]

ADAPTIVE DISCRIMINATION

1257

they change to accommodate new legal rules, and regenerative, as
they continuously re-create and sustain racial hierarchy.
2. White Privilege Norms, Racialized Class Ideologies, and Implicit
Racial Bias
The previous Section described discriminatory social practices
that have survived by evading antidiscrimination law and equality
mandates. Here, I explore the dynamics of this process in greater
depth to explain how discrimination persists despite formal bans on
intentional discrimination and antiracist social norms.116 This inquiry
first requires that we probe the nature of white privilege and
racialized ideologies of class. When mapped onto our inherited
landscapes, these hidden social systems both perpetuate and obscure
racial inequality. Because they operate in the background, beyond
our conscious awareness,117 they limit our ability to see and, therefore,
to define, the problem. In so doing, they facilitate adaptive
discrimination.
Martha Mahoney and Peggy McIntosh collectively describe
“white privilege” as “ ‘an invisible weightless knapsack’ of
provisions, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, compasses, and
blank checks.”118 As Mahoney argues, this privilege “facilitates
mobility and comfort in ordinary life,” the routine benefits of which
are invisible to whites.119 “Whiteness” here refers to “a ‘standpoint’
from which [white] people look at [themselves], at others, and at
society; and a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and
unnamed.”120 Within this framework, whiteness becomes raceless. As
the dominant norm, it has no “impact”121 because it defines and,
therefore, prescribes the natural state of affairs. White privilege thus
116. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (observing that society
“rejects racism as immoral”).
117. Cashin, supra note 65, at 34 (“A large body of evidence from experimental
psychology demonstrates unconscious bias on the part of whites and minorities against
racial minorities, especially African-Americans. This is in contrast to a dramatic reduction
in explicit (reported) bias.”).
118. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1665 (citing Peggy McIntosh, White
Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences
Through Work in Women’s Studies 1–2 (Wellesley Coll., Ctr. for Research on Women,
Working Paper No. 189, 1988)); see also Cashin, supra note 65, at 34.
119. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1665. Mahoney writes that “[w]hite
privilege . . . includes the ability to not-see whiteness and its privileges.” Id. at 1666.
120. Id. at 1664.
121. Id. at 1666.
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fosters adaptive discrimination because it conceals how race operates
in society. Practices that reinforce whiteness norms are not deemed
discriminatory because they merely reinforce the accepted,
established order.
Take residential segregation, which has persisted for generations
despite civil rights laws that ban intentional discrimination in the
housing market.122 Under these laws, it is unlawful to refuse to sell or
rent a home to an African American because of race. Society also
formally condemns such practices.123
But let us assume that a predominantly white town adopts a
zoning law that effectively prohibits low-income housing. As a result,
African Americans, who are disproportionately poor, are less likely
to move into the town. Let us further assume that a group of AfricanAmerican plaintiffs sues the town for racial discrimination. Absent
factors that suggest a racial motive, an equal protection claim is
unlikely to succeed.124 Indeed, many people may not regard the
zoning law as racially discriminatory, even though it effectively
preserves the whiteness of the neighborhood itself.125 White residents
may even be offended that the town has been accused of racial
discrimination. The assertion is troubling because it requires whites to
perceive and to acknowledge both their whiteness and white
privilege.126 It intrudes upon a state of affairs that they regard
(however unconsciously) as natural and, therefore, unobjectionable.
It is possible that the plaintiffs here could ultimately prevail on a
statutory claim that prohibits policies and practices adversely

122. See Ford, supra note 19, at 1849–57.
123. See Lawrence, supra note 116, at 323.
124. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
125. For an account of how advantages of neighborhood, wealth, social networks, and
higher-education admissions can reproduce in the absence of intentional discrimination,
see ROITHMAYR, supra note 19, at 60–81.
126. As Mahoney observes, in this context many whites may not even notice that their
neighborhoods are entirely white because they are “part of the ‘natural’ world, helping to
keep their whiteness unnoticed and undisturbed, and helping to equate whiteness with
something that reflects positive values and feels like home.” Mahoney, Segregation, supra
note 20, at 1664. In this respect, whites are also unlikely to perceive the whiteness of their
neighborhood as the legacy of prior government practices that required, and then
facilitated, segregation. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1987); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but
Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91
MICH. L. REV. 953, 976, 982 (1993).
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affecting people of color.127 But it is far from clear that this kind of
claim carries the same social stigma as a claim for intentional racial
discrimination.128 As already indicated, the claim readily lends itself to
class-based, rather than race-based, justifications. White residents
may disclaim racial bias by contending that the law does not target
people of color, but rather only precludes low-income people from
living in the neighborhood, an outcome that is more socially
acceptable.129 Blacks have not been excluded from the neighborhood
because of their race—the response goes—but simply because they do
not have the income or wealth to buy a house in the area. The real
problem, therefore, is disparate class resources. With class at the fore
of the narrative and with its racial dimensions now obscured, white
residents can comfortably defend their neighborhood as one that only
“happens-to-be-white,” rather than one that is intentionally white. In
this way, the whiteness of the neighborhood retains its legitimacy
under the law and its immunity from social sanction.130
These racialized class ideologies—which are explicitly associated
with class, but correlate with race—foster adaptive discrimination.131
Race is operative because these ideologies often have a
disproportionately adverse racial impact, though not necessarily in
ways that are detectible by law or by our social radar.132 The zoning

127. Such a zoning law may violate the Fair Housing Act under a “disparate impact”
theory of liability. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015).
128. Cf. Mahoney, Class and Status, supra note 21, at 801 (describing efforts to assert
class in order to avoid discussions of racial inequality).
129. Id.; cf. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1667–68 (observing how white
“elites” manipulate racial narratives to blame less-elite whites for racism, while
“exonerat[ing] [themselves] from responsibility for the reproduction of racial power and
subordination”).
130. We could complicate the hypothetical to show that white residents approved the
zoning law out of a desire to preclude poor blacks—not necessarily poor whites—from
moving in. Indeed, studies indicate that low-income whites on average live in wealthier
neighborhoods than middle-class blacks, suggesting that class itself is racialized. See
Tami Luhby, Middle Class Whites Live in Nicer Neighborhoods Than Blacks, CNN
MONEY (June 26, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/26/news/economy/middle-classneighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/TJ74-U2UJ] (reviewing a study conducted by the
Stanford Graduate School of Education).
131. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1360–64, 1369–81, 1384 (1988) (observing that “until the distinct racial nature of class
ideology is [] revealed and debunked, nothing can be done about the underlying structural
problems that account for the disparities”).
132. See generally United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185–86 (8th Cir.
1974) (explaining that a plaintiff can establish a rebuttable presumption of a valid Title
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law disproportionately isolates and contains blacks, but constitutional
law privileges and legitimizes the class-based explanation and
therefore insulates its racial dimensions from scrutiny. Even an
otherwise successful statutory claim, brought under the disparate
impact theory alluded to above, may run into constitutional trouble if
it advances an explicit racial remedy.133 As a result, the constitutional
narrative disguises these racial dynamics, even as it tolerates their
racial effects, allowing them to fester and to corrode equality.
Pervasive implicit racial bias further complicates the problem, as
it generates racial reactions that may be unknown even to the
individual who harbors them.134 As Charles Lawrence has explained,
this lack of awareness can be traced to cognitive processes that refuse
to acknowledge “ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the
individual has learned is good or right.”135 People cannot detect their
racial bias because their minds have blocked their ability to recognize
it.136 The social dominance of widely accepted “beliefs and
preferences” about African Americans and other people of color
further obscures their racial dimensions.137 Identifying and labeling
these beliefs is more difficult when they function as “part of the
individual’s rational ordering of her perceptions of the world[,]”138
rather than being understood as an explicit choice about what to think
and how to act. This disconnect between an individual’s hidden
understandings and sociocultural norms on the one hand, and the
racialized impact of on-the-ground practices on the other, helps to
perpetuate the status quo. If we cannot recognize the problem, we
cannot begin to address it.
VIII disparate impact claim based on a showing of discriminatory effect where a city
justified a discriminatory zoning ordinance on the grounds that dispersed low-income
housing would devalue neighboring homes).
133. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015) (“Remedial orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise
difficult constitutional questions.”).
134. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT:
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013) (observing that many people harbor hidden
biases of which they are unaware); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 468–90 (2010)
(discussing peer-reviewed studies that document the prevalence of implicit bias).
135. See Lawrence, supra note 116, at 322 (discussing a Freudian rationale “for the
unconscious nature of . . . racially discriminatory beliefs and ideas”).
136. See id. at 322–23 (observing that “while our historical experience has made racism
an integral part of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an ideal that
rejects racism as immoral”).
137. See id. at 323.
138. Id.
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3. The Ability to Exit Antidiscrimination Regimes
The previous Section explored how inherently discriminatory
individual and sociocultural beliefs, disguised as racially neutral
adherence to the status quo, perpetuate racially unequal outcomes.
This Section assembles these discrete observations to make explicit a
core aspect of adaptive discrimination—whites’ ability to “exit” or
withdraw from antidiscrimination or equality-oriented regimes139 by
resorting to alternatives outside the “official system.”140 As indicated
above, these alternatives can include private schooling arrangements
and changes in hiring and promotion techniques, policing and law
enforcement practices, and methods for qualifying voters that avoid
antidiscrimination mandates.
These insights draw on Marc Galanter’s seminal article about the
dynamics in our legal system that favor the “haves” (over the “havenots”).141 Galanter identified features of the “architecture of the legal
system” that limit law’s use as a tool for redistributive social
change.142 One important feature of this architecture is the ability of
those with resources to opt out of social systems that no longer serve
their needs or satisfy their preferences and to opt into alternative
institutional arrangements that allow them to pursue their goals using
different means.
In an adaptive context, whites’ capacity to exit antidiscrimination
regimes increases as alternative institutional structures and partners
become available and as “the costs of withdrawal, transfer, relocation,
development of new relationships, [and] the pull of loyalty to
previous arrangements” diminish.143 As indicated above, exiting
integrated institutions is relatively costless for whites due to belief
systems, norms, behaviors, and latent biases that tolerate, or at least
fail to stigmatize, the resulting racial inequality.
Take the example of public school integration. Although
research shows that whites have become more accepting of
139. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124 (1974); cf. Paul C. Gewirtz, Remedies and
Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 629–30 (1983) (noting that “[w]hites who object to
integration in a city’s public schools and who have the flexibility and the resources may
decide to ‘flee’ by sending their children to private schools or by choosing to live in
another community”).
140. See Gewirtz, supra note 139, at 629–30; see also Galanter, supra note 139, at 124–
35.
141. See Galanter, supra note 139, at 136–51.
142. Id. at 149.
143. Id. at 126.
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integration over time, the same research shows that they are still
generally uncomfortable with it.144 Whites are more inclined to leave a
public school as the number of “nonwhite” children in the school
increases.145 Indeed, “white flight” from integrating public schools has
long been a barrier to school integration.146
However, whites can only leave a racially integrated school if
they have an alternative school to attend. Private schools, charter
schools, and public schools in predominantly white school districts
provide white parents with options for avoiding integration. As
discussed in Part II, law enables whites to “exit” public school
integration by protecting their decision to exercise choice over these
and other alternative educational environments.147
At the same time, the social and emotional costs of equality
mandates can be high if they require whites to confront white
privilege, to acknowledge the racialized dimensions of class that
preserve such privilege, and to identify biases that linger beneath
their conscious awareness. As a result, whites may more readily resort
to systems that operate according to “parochial norms and concerns”
outside the bounds of antidiscrimination law, including the right to
exclude persons of perceived “low status.”148 In the context of school
integration, this can lead whites to identify concerns, such as
144. See Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Can We Live Together? Racial Preferences and
Neighborhood Outcomes, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 45, 56 (Xavier de Souza
Briggs ed., 2005).
145. See Kimberly Goyette, Setting the Context (“More recent research on the effects
of school choice on school segregation finds that the proportion of nonwhite students in
public schools affects the likelihood of white enrollment in private, charter, and magnet
schools, even when controlling for measures of school quality, including graduation rates,
test scores, safety, and student-teacher ratios.”), in CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING
SCHOOLS 1, 8–9 (Annette Lareau & Kimberly Goyette eds., 2014).
146. See Janelle Scott, School Choice as a Civil Right: The Political Construction of a
Claim and Its Implications for School Desegregation (“During the civil rights movement,
choice became a controversial and popular tool for policy makers who wished to defy
Brown’s mandate to desegregate public schools by providing ‘multiple escape routes’ for
white students.”), in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 32, 37 (2011); see
also, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984) (rejecting a challenge by the parents of
black school children linking the integration of public schools to the failure of the IRS to
deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory public schools), abrogated by Lexmark
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); Gewirtz, supra note
139, at 629–30.
147. See infra Part II.
148. See, e.g., Klint Alexander & Kern Alexander, Vouchers and the Privatization of
American Education: Justifying Racial Resegregation from Brown to Zelman, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1131, 1137–41 (discussing the historical use of school vouchers to enable whites to
escape the mandate to integrate under Brown); cf. Galanter, supra note 139, at 146.
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perception of a school’s level of “safety,” that are not (explicitly)
racial in order to avoid appearances of racial bias.149
These antidiscrimination mandates, in other words, seek to
reconfigure systems that entrench inequality. Yet, the call to shift
from a status quo that feels natural, ordinary, and customary, to
circumstances that are different and uncomfortable, incentivizes
exit.150 Whites who fear difference have both opportunity and motive,
both individually and as a group, to adopt behaviors and policies that
allow them to opt out of equality mandates, free from either social or
legal censure.
4. The Problems of Agency and Time
Two additional points warrant mention here, as they further
illustrate how our social and legal understandings fail to cohere with
the realities of racial discrimination.
The first of these issues concerns agency. Adaptive
discrimination presumes that racially subordinated people have very
little, if any, agency or control over the dynamic systems that
perpetuate racial inequality. For many, this idea will seem
fundamentally antithetical to America’s individualist ethos.151 The
notion that anyone lacks control over her environment may make
little sense. To see why this intuition misses the mark in the race
context, however, requires a practical understanding of the powerful
forces that are often arrayed against people of color.152
We can return to the earlier example of the predominantly white
town that has passed a zoning ordinance precluding affordable
housing. Once again, chances are that an African American will have
a harder time buying into or renting in the town because she is more
149. This American Life: The Problem We All Live With, CHI. PUB. RADIO (July 31,
2015), http://m.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/562/the-problem-we-all-livewith [http://perma.cc/7W7Y-YCCF] (reporting on white parents’ opposition to integration
under the auspices of “school safety” in a predominantly white town in Missouri).
150. Indeed, Galanter posits that groups resort to law precisely because they are
excluded from the system of relationships that might allow them to redress their
grievances privately. See Galanter, supra note 139, at 130 (“[T]he more inclusive in lifespace and temporal span a relationship between parties, the less likely it is that those
parties will resort to the official [legal] system and more likely that the relationship will be
regulated by some independent ‘private’ system.”); see also, e.g., Alexander & Alexander,
supra note 148, at 1137–41.
151. Cf. Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and
Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1194–98 (2000) (discussing the
presumption that individual exercises agency over discrimination).
152. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 4.
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likely to be lower income.153 She also likely has far less wealth (which
she might otherwise use to supplement her low income) than whites
in the town,154 increasing the improbability of such a move. If she
grew up in a racially segregated school district, there is a good chance
that she will have trouble finding the kind of decent-paying job that
would eventually enable her to move into the town.155 If she lives in
an urban environment, it may be more difficult for her to leave, given
the array of social, environmental, and economic factors that degrade
her choices and opportunities.156 In short, she is trapped at almost
every turn by a system that denies her upward mobility and access to
a better life.157
These racial dynamics point to a central problem that underlies
adaptive discrimination: “the structure of the system gives rise to its
behavior.”158 This means that the choices exercised by people within
the system are shaped by the system itself and that even people who
may be very different from each other will still “behave in similar
ways.”159 Understanding these dynamics helps us to resist the problem
153. See PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE
END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 4 (2013) (observing that at the end of
the 2000s approximately seventy-eight percent of African Americans “were in the bottom
three-fifths of the non-immigrant income distribution” in the United States).
154. Id. at 112 (noting that “African Americans still have 40 percent less wealth” than
whites after “adjusting for parents’ education, income, and occupation”); see also HEATHER
BETH JOHNSON, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE POWER OF WEALTH: CHOOSING
SCHOOLS AND INHERITING INEQUALITY IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY 1–9 (2006);
ROITHMAYR, supra note 19, at 67 (“Residents of segregated neighborhoods own smaller and
older properties worth much less, and accordingly are far less likely to pass down money for
a college education or a housing down payment to the next generation.”).
155. See ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEE & GARY ORFIELD, CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE
DREAM? 5 (2003), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/a-multiracial-society-with-segregated-schools-are-we-losing-the-dream/frankenberg
-multiracial-society-losing-the-dream.pdf [http://perma.cc/R22Y-V3MH]
(describing
“apartheid schools”—intensely segregated schools with “enormous poverty, limited
resources, and social and health problems of many types”—that “educate one-sixth of the
nation’s black students and one-fourth of black students in the Northeast and Midwest”);
ROITHMAYR, supra note 19, at 65 (discussing the employment advantages of (predominantly
white) wealthy parents who “pass on” employment opportunities to their children).
156. See SHARKEY, supra note 153, at 2–5, 180.
157. The consequences of this severely depressed opportunity are intergenerational.
See id. at 2 (“It is common to hear about the continuing expansion of the black middle
class . . . [but] while there is a slightly greater presence of African Americans in the middle
and the high ends of the income distribution, a close look at the data shows that the
overall level of economic advancement among African Americans [since the beginning of
the 1970s] has been remarkably limited.”).
158. See Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 16.
159. Id.
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of “fundamental attribution error.”160 This problem refers to the
mistaken judgments that arise when system participants fail to take
account of how systems structure human responses.161 We attribute
these responses to “dispositional rather than situational factors[,]”
and to “character flaws . . . rather than to the system in which the[]
people are embedded.”162 Our protagonist in the preceding paragraph
is no less hardworking or innately capable than the white residents of
the town, but her freedom to make different choices has been
severely constrained due to factors beyond her control that have
accumulated and regenerated for decades.163
We might draw on the same insights to explain whites’
preferences for predominantly white neighborhoods, which were
described earlier. One view is that these preferences are
“dispositional”—that is, that whites somehow innately prefer allwhite environments.164 Alternatively, we can view these preferences
as “situational,”165 meaning that whites have been conditioned to
avoid blacks as a result of policies and practices handed down over a
period of several hundred years. The perception that whites are
inherently racist is a fundamental attribution error, because it fails to
consider that they too are a product of the social environment,
historical context, and overarching structure of racial discrimination.
The difference between dispositional and situational
explanations may lead us to more optimistic conclusions about
adaptive discrimination and the possibilities for addressing it, which I
turn to briefly in Part III. On the former view, there may not be much
that law can do to change whites’ “predisposition” to oppose
integration, especially if that predisposition is reinforced by other
component parts of a pervasively discriminatory system. The latter
view, however, suggests that we might change whites’ receptivity to
160. Id.
161. Id. (“A fundamental principle of system dynamics states that the structure of the
system gives rise to its behavior.”).
162. Id.; cf. Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1124
(2006) (discussing how people adapt to subordination).
163. See Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1357 (“Black people do not create their
oppressive worlds moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in worlds created
and maintained by others.”).
164. Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 16 (“[P]eople have a
strong tendency to attribute the behavior of others to dispositional rather than situational
factors—that is, to character (and, in particular, character flaws) rather than to the system
in which these people are embedded.”).
165. Id.
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integration if we could just get them to try it by altering the
underlying structural context.
The second issue relevant to an understanding of adaptive
discrimination concerns the heuristic of time. Our human tendency is
to favor simplistic solutions to multifaceted problems and then to
judge the success (or failure) of these solutions prematurely.166 Yet
these cognitive shortcuts can lead us to ignore the fluidity and
complexity of our predicaments167 and to overlook the problem of
time lags that inhere in adaptive discrimination due to active and
passive resistance to antidiscrimination mandates.168 Accordingly, we
presume that racial discrimination necessarily subsides with time,169
which in turn generates unrealistic expectations about what can be
achieved within a limited time horizon. Because we have yet to learn
these lessons, we are often deceived by the passage of time in the
context of race.
To understand this point better, we can analogize racial
discrimination to human disease. Let us say we have a rash. When we
apply medication to our rash, we expect that it will heal with time.
But what if the rash really is a symptom of a more systemic malady,
such as cancer, that has spread throughout the body? Time can only
“heal” the wound if we have correctly diagnosed the problem and
applied the correct medication for a long enough period to treat the
underlying condition. This might require that we change the
medication as the disease itself spreads and assumes different forms.
In other words, we cannot depend on time alone to tell us whether we
are cured. Time does not inevitably lead to improvement if we
misunderstand the problem. In fact, if anything, time can exacerbate
the problem if we leave the malady untreated.
Understanding both the role that dynamic systems play in
structuring individual behavior and the limits of time as a proxy for

166. Sterman, Climate Change, supra note 44, at 816–17 (discussing how
misconceptions of time lead to miscalculations in fashioning remedies).
167. See Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 16 (“The heuristics we
use to judge causal relationships systematically lead to cognitive maps that ignore
feedbacks, nonlinearities, time delays, and other elements of dynamic complexity.”).
168. Cf. id. at 12 tbl.2 (“In complex systems cause and effect are distant in time and
space while we tend to look for causes near the events we seek to explain. Our attention is
drawn to the symptoms of difficulty rather than the underlying cause. High leverage
policies are often not obvious.”).
169. See FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 5 (critiquing the scholarly approach that “typically
views the race problem as not foundational to society, but as temporary and gradually
disappearing as a result perhaps of increasing modernity”).
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racial progress deepens our understanding of racial discrimination.
Actuated through events set in motion long ago, discrimination can
surface in new places and forms and may breed consequences that are
not perceived for years, even generations. As a result, the true impact
of racial discrimination—and the remedies that we design to redress
it—may take some time to fully unfold. Appreciating the many
dimensions of this problem requires that we reformulate our
assumptions about how long it takes to dislodge discrimination that
has been hardwired over generations. This in turn requires that we
adapt our time horizons for realizing meaningful social change. We
have to match the dynamic complexity of racial discrimination with
systemic responses that are equally dynamic and adaptive.
As Part II explains below, constitutional doctrine consistently
misdiagnoses the problem of racial discrimination. Its heavy reliance
on time as a proxy leads courts to terminate remedial measures
prematurely on the assumption that they have outlived their
usefulness. Because judges presume that racial discrimination
expires—rather than acknowledging that it adapts—they also
presume that racial discrimination from “long ago” is no longer
constitutionally relevant. In this regard, they miss how present-day
racial disparities were operationalized and embedded in our social
landscapes by past discrimination.
B.

A Practical Account of Adaptive Discrimination

Here is a quick test. What do the following have in common: a
racial zoning law struck down by the Supreme Court in 1917, the 1972
demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing projects in St. Louis, and the
2014 shooting death of an unarmed black teenager by a white police
officer, mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this Article? The
answer is that together they illustrate adaptive discrimination as it
stretches through time to regenerate racial inequality. This Section
illustrates how systems that were designed to evade and subvert
antidiscrimination law created the supervening conditions for the
fatal encounter between the teenager and the Ferguson police officer.
Because we tend to perceive racial discrimination in subject-driven
frames, these examples help us understand racial discrimination as a
subordinating system that adapts as new legal regimes take effect. It
also allows us to appreciate the connection between and among
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different forms of discrimination and how they persist from the past
to the present.170
We can start this narrative in 1917. In an earlier period, St. Louis,
like so many places around the country,171 had racial zoning
ordinances that prohibited blacks from moving into predominantly
white areas.172 However, in 1917, the Supreme Court declared these
policies unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley.173 Undeterred by the
Court’s ruling, St. Louis concocted another approach.174 It removed
overt references to race in its zoning laws and adopted rules that
designated single-family residential housing for the virtually all-white
areas of the city, while prohibiting other uses that blacks (who were
disproportionately poor) could afford.175 Deed restrictions on private
property that barred blacks from moving in176 helped to effectuate the
scheme.177 Thus, under the guise of municipal laws that were
ostensibly race-neutral, city officials—in concert with private
parties—created and perpetuated racial segregation that would not
readily be detected by law.178
Having purposefully created white neighborhoods, city planners
then manipulated zoning rules to ensure that the least desirable uses
of land, such as “taverns, liquor stores, nightclubs, and houses of
prostitution”179 would be located next to, or in, black
170. Many of my examples are rooted in a black-white paradigm. By using these
examples, I do not intend to exclude other people of color from my analysis. Rather, I use
this paradigm only to illustrate the core, historical functionality of racial discrimination.
171. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7; REYNOLDS FARLEY, SHELDON DANZIGER &
HARRY J. HOLZER, DETROIT DIVIDED 145–48 (2000).
172. Id. at 7.
173. 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (striking down a racial zoning ordinance on due process
grounds).
174. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 14 (describing public entanglement in racially restrictive covenants).
177. Id. at 7, 12–15. The first such restrictive covenant was recorded in St. Louis in
1910. Id. at 13. These restrictive covenants operated with legal sanction until Shelley v.
Kraemer declared them constitutionally unenforceable in 1948. 334 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1948).
However, the use of such covenants persisted in many jurisdictions for decades. See
JACKSON, supra note 126, at 201–15.
178. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7 (“[St. Louis] developed these new rules with racial
purposes unhidden, although race was not written into the text of the zoning rules
themselves.”).
179. Id. at 9; see also FARLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 146; BERYL SATTER, FAMILY
PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK AMERICA 6
(2010) (attributing the decline of “many black urban neighborhoods” to exploitative real
estate practices that preyed on “hard-pressed but hard-working and ambitious African
Americans”).
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neighborhoods.180 Because of these practices, many homes owned or
rented by blacks were ineligible for federally backed mortgages, many
of which included underwriting policies that prohibited federal
guarantees for properties located next to “inharmonious uses.”181
While undermining middle-class investment in black
neighborhoods, federal policy also concentrated racialized poverty in
central cities. This effort began in St. Louis through the intentional
destruction of racially integrated communities.182 In the early 1950s,
the city began to build the Pruitt-Igoe towers, high-rise projects
designated to house poor blacks.183 A decade later, Pruitt-Igoe
“became a national symbol of dysfunctional public housing.”184 The
terrible social conditions, combined with the city’s neglect of the
housing project’s physical plant, made tenant life “untenable.”185 The
conditions became so bad that beginning in 1972, the federal
government “evicted all residents and dynamited the 33 towers.”186
As government policies pushed poor blacks into the central city,
the Federal Housing Administration opened homeownership
opportunities exclusively for whites in the suburbs.187 Federal
investment in white communities in turn spurred significant private
investment.188 These racialized patterns of public and private
disinvestment deepened the racial divide across the St. Louis
metropolitan area,189 with the city’s north side becoming identifiably
black, and the south side identifiably white.190 The economic impact

180. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7–9.
181. Id. at 15 (“Beginning in 1934, and continuing thereafter, [Federal Housing
Administration] underwriting manuals stated that ‘protection against some adverse
influences is obtained by the proper zoning and deed restrictions that prevail in the
neighborhood’ and elaborated that ‘the more important among the adverse influential
factors are the ingress of undesirable racial or nationality groups.’ ”). Real estate owners
took advantage of the high demand for black housing and limited supply to warehouse
blacks in “racial ghettos,” where they were forced to pay exorbitant sums for dilapidated
units. FARLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 146; ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE
MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890–1920, at 91–111 (1967).
182. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 10–12 (discussing efforts to destroy integrated
neighborhoods).
183. Id. at 12.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See JACKSON, supra note 126, at 203–15; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 12
(describing purposeful segregation in federal public housing policy).
188. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 14–19.
189. Id. at 15.
190. Id.
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of this racial segregation was striking. The precipitous decline of black
neighborhoods was matched only by the upswing in public investment
in white neighborhoods.191 As black income stagnated, white wealth
increased dramatically.192 Employment discrimination by the biggest
local employers and by predominantly white unions further
exacerbated the vast and growing racial disparities.193
Denied the investment and resources that had been extended to
white suburbanites, the economic infrastructure of black
neighborhoods collapsed.194 Services “like trash collection, street
lighting, and emergency response” were whittled away.195 In return,
St. Louis devised urban renewal programs to eliminate black
neighborhoods.196 The thinly disguised goal, incentivized by federal
policy, was to push blacks out of the city.197 Effectively barred by
exclusionary zoning ordinances in suburbs south of the city, by real
estate practices that steered blacks away from white neighborhoods,
and other forms of public and private discrimination, many blacks
resettled in the northern and northwestern suburbs of St. Louis
County, where Ferguson is located.198
But the move to Ferguson and other northern suburbs only
created additional problems for the region’s new black residents.
Understanding this point requires some appreciation of the
metropolitan region’s highly fragmented jurisdictional system that
stretched municipal resources.199 Originally designed in part to
perpetuate racial segregation,200 the patchwork of separate
jurisdictions meant that small towns and cities were forced to
191. See JACKSON, supra note 126, at 209–15 (describing federal and private
investment in white suburbs and disinvestment in minority neighborhoods).
192. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 124–29 (1998).
193. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 28.
194. See id. at 4–5 (suggesting that black neighborhoods were intentionally denied
services, such as curbs, that were made available to other parts of the city).
195. Id. at 19.
196. Id.; see also SHARKEY, supra note 153, at 180 (noting the “razing of
neighborhoods during urban renewal”).
197. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 14–19 (discussing federal programs designed to
push blacks out of the city).
198. Id. at 18–19.
199. See Peter Coy, The County Map that Explains Ferguson’s Tragic Discord,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-15/how-stdot-louis-countys-map-explains-fergusons-racial-discord [http://perma.cc/7R4W-A5JD].
200. Id. (“Dating as far back as the 19th century, communities set themselves up as
municipalities to capture control of tax revenue from local businesses, to avoid paying
taxes to support poorer neighbors, or to exclude blacks.”).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

2016]

ADAPTIVE DISCRIMINATION

1271

compete for a limited pool of tax revenue, leaving fewer fiscal
resources for services that were already reduced as a result of the
relatively small tax base.201
The influx of blacks spurred white flight202 from Ferguson and
other northern suburbs.203 However, rapid racial turnover in the
population, combined with voting schemes designed to dilute
minority voting strength, extended Ferguson’s white power structure
and its dominance over the majority-black population.204 To address
persistently low sources of municipal revenue, white officials directed
law enforcement to ticket and fine residents in black neighborhoods
for minor municipal offenses.205 Blacks who could not pay were jailed
at disproportionately high rates and charged compounded interest,
leading to even higher fines over time.206 Law enforcement’s
predatory behavior toward black residents sowed deep community
distrust and resentment of the local police.207
This is the point where the story of the officer’s fatal shooting of
a black teenager on the Ferguson streets typically begins. But as we
can see, this conventional account skips over nearly one-hundred
years of racial history.208 And it pointedly leaves out historical
context—such as the early racial zoning law and the concentration of
racialized poverty in St. Louis that led to the notorious Pruitt-Igoe
towers and, eventually, to efforts by St. Louis officials to expel blacks
from the city. These historical moments allow us to unpack the
racialized dynamics and tension that unfolded in Ferguson after the
teenager’s death and to identify the discriminatory behavior and

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 31 (“African Americans who were displaced
then relocated to the few other places available, converting towns like Ferguson into new
segregated enclaves.”); see also id. at 23; Hannah-Jones, supra note 9.
204. See Smith, supra note 9.
205. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 4–5; Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St.
Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profitsfrom-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/UZJ7-2F5C] (describing municipal fines for having “uncut
grass or unkempt property[,]” “wearing saggy pants[,]” or “not subscribing to the town’s
only approved garbage collection service”).
206. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 54–56 (describing the system of unduly harsh
penalties and steep interest payments in the Ferguson police system).
207. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 31.
208. This account also notably fails to mention the infamous St. Louis case of Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which declared that blacks had no rights
that the “white man was bound to respect.” Id. at 407.
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attitudes that have been transmitted by public and private actors
through time.
This sprawling, unwieldy narrative—of different kinds of public
and private discrimination across multiple geographies through the
generations—offers a different, diagnostic approach to understanding
the fatal encounter between the black teenager and white officer. It
enables us to understand the complex forces that set the stage for this
tragic moment and to be alert to the presence of adaptive techniques
in other areas. The youth’s death triggered our search for deeper
explanations about the multidimensional reasons for our racial
inequality. However, we could use the same diagnostic approach to
explain similar racial disparities throughout the country.
In sum, we can seek to understand race the way we seek to
understand human disease. Just as a doctor takes a person’s family
history to determine the origins of a serious illness, we also need to
look back in time to figure out how we arrived at this place of deep
racial dysfunction and tragedy. Understanding this history helps us to
understand the present. I return to these points in Part III, where I
explore what the law might do to address adaptive discrimination and
to help shine a light on our hidden racialized systems.
II. HOW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FACILITATES ADAPTIVE
DISCRIMINATION
In her path-breaking book, The New Jim Crow, Michelle
Alexander tells the story of Jarvious Cotton, an African-American
parolee unable to vote due to the felon disenfranchisement law in his
state:
Jarvious Cotton cannot vote . . . . Cotton’s great-greatgrandfather could not vote as a slave. His great-grandfather was
beaten to death by the Ku Klux Klan for attempting to
vote . . . . His father was barred from voting by poll taxes and
literacy tests. Today, Jarvious Cotton cannot vote because he,
like many Black men in the United States, has been labeled a
felon and is currently on parole.209
This short narrative illustrates each of the components of adaptive
discrimination outlined in the previous Part’s sections. It involves
discrimination in voting and law enforcement, insofar as blacks
comprise a disproportionate number of those imprisoned and, thus, a

209. ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 1.
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disproportionate
number
of
those
affected
by
felon
disfranchisement.210 It also shows the dynamism of racial
discrimination through the multiple iterations of race-explicit and
formally race-neutral voting schemes that have denied black voting
rights since slavery, resulting in racial subordination across the
generations.
Finally, Alexander’s example illustrates the regenerative aspects
of discrimination: the inability to vote diminishes the political
leverage of minority populations to change racially discriminatory
government policies.211 Segregated schools and housing, the predatory
behaviors of law enforcement commanded to contain blacks in their
isolated spaces, and the host of social ills that flowed across
generations from these tragic systems (from his grandfather, to his
father, to Cotton himself) are all the products of adaptive
discrimination’s invisible operation. Discrimination in these contexts
generates other pernicious consequences downstream, as blacks are
shut out of centers of social and economic opportunity in ways that
disempower whole communities and neighborhoods. Once its full
dimensions are unpacked, Cotton’s story demonstrates why we can
never hope to arrest more than a tiny amount of racial inequality
through constitutional law in its current form, which focuses primarily
on intent.
Conventional legal and social theories of racial discrimination
reject the premise of adaptive discrimination that past discrimination
is connected to present systemic racial disadvantage.212 This Part
focuses on the deficiencies in constitutional doctrine, but similar
210. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985).
211. For example, a recent U.S. Department of Justice report indicated that the City of
Ferguson, Missouri aggressively tickets African Americans and uses the resulting revenue
from fines to fund the city’s municipal budget. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 4–5.
Because Missouri law limits the ability of persons convicted of a felony to vote, see
Howard v. United States, No. 4:06CV563 CDP, 2009 WL 1211164, at *7 (E.D. Mo. May 1,
2009) (describing a Missouri law that restores voting rights to former felons only after they
have completed incarceration and supervision), Jarvious Cotton could not vote to change
this policy if he lived in Ferguson. See Marie Ceselski, Voter Registration for Felons and 18
Year Olds, GREAT ST. OF ST. LOUIS (Jan. 3, 2015), http://thegreatstateofstlouis.wordpress
.com/category/voter-registration/ [https://perma.cc/BM6X-5NCL] (indicating that felons
may not vote until they have completed their “sentence, probation, or parole”). An
estimated “18,000 ex-offenders” live in the St. Louis area. See Steve Giegerich, New
Hiring Guidelines Help Ex-offenders Gain Foothold in Job Market, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/new-hiring-guidelineshelp-ex-offenders-gain-foothold-in-job/article_706f0388-9094-11e1-bbf9-0019bb30f31a
.html [https://perma.cc/VM76-VMXZ].
212. See Freeman, supra note 88, at 1056 (defining “causation principle”).
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deficiencies exist in the siloed organization of civil rights claims, with
separate statutes for voting,213 housing,214 employment,215 public
accommodations,216 and criminal justice,217 among others.218 This
fragmentation in antidiscrimination law obscures the interaction and
cross-fertilization of racial discrimination across different social,
organizational, and institutional contexts.219 Constitutional doctrine
suffers from similar limitations. We are not encouraged to see the
ways in which Jarvious Cotton’s voting problems relate to the mass
incarceration of people of color. Nor do we even think about the ways
in which the shooting of the teenager in Ferguson relates to housing
segregation or to transportation policies in the wider St. Louis area.220
By cabining discrimination, we overlook the dynamic relationships
and connections between and among its different forms. We miss the
full dimensions of racial subordination and the broader picture of
racial discrimination as a whole, living, evolving organism.
Section II.A discusses the linear aspects of equal protection
doctrine. Section II.B describes early cases that acknowledged
adaptive forms of discrimination. Section II.C explores how
constitutional law has short-circuited judicial and legislative remedies
for discrimination by tying time to determinations about racial
motive. I then apply these insights to the Civil Rights Cases, school
desegregation, and the Court’s more recent decision in Shelby County
v. Holder, which struck down a seminal provision of the Voting
Rights Act.
213. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012).
214. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012) (declaring the provision of
fair housing to be among the public policy goals of the United States).
215. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
216. See id. § 2000a.
217. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012) (prohibiting a conspiracy to deprive any person of
federal constitutional rights); § 242 (making it a federal crime to willfully deprive someone
of his civil rights under federal constitutional or statutory law).
218. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting intentional discrimination by entities that
receive government funding); § 1981 (barring discrimination in contracts). Although there
are some similarities between constitutional law and statutory civil rights laws, they also
diverge in important ways. See Rich, supra note 14, at 238 (discussing the “divergence and
convergence” of constitutional doctrine and statutory law). Constitutional litigation that
cuts across subject areas has more promise, but it has been rebuffed in the federal courts.
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995).
219. Cf., e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281–82 (2011)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s differential, context-dependent application of equal
protection principles).
220. But see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 4–7, 15–16 (discussing how successive public
policies segregated Ferguson and created a racially divisive atmosphere).
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A. The Linearity of Equal Protection
1. Neutralizing Racial Intent
Equal protection assumes that racial discrimination is linear,
involving the denial of a particular benefit or the placement of a
particular burden on an identifiable person or group of persons
because of their race. This transactional narrative is discrete and timecentered; its harms are presumably confined only to the litigants
themselves. Within this paradigm, the role of constitutional law is
simply to neutralize intentionally discriminatory conduct.221 Cases like
Washington v. Davis222—which held that disproportionate, adverse
racial effects alone are not cognizable under equal protection223—
along with Personnel Administrator v. Feeney224 and McCleskey v.
Kemp225—which heightened the standard for showing discriminatory
intent—created this framework.226
Legal scholars have long critiqued the intent paradigm as too
narrow and formalistic.227 Alan Freeman argued decades ago that
equal protection ratifies systemic racial discrimination by ignoring the
conditions that perpetuate vast racial disadvantage.228 To sustain a
claim, plaintiffs must begin by identifying the bad actor responsible
for harmful outcomes that are traceable to specific prior
discrimination.229 Furthermore, actionable discrimination must
221. Freeman, supra note 88, at 1053. An abundance of legal scholarship has explored
the counter-majoritarian and institutional competence concerns that underlie the intent
doctrine. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 42, at 1; Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 95;
Foster, supra note 30, at 1121–22 (discussing various theories of the intent doctrine and
offering a more nuanced account); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1134–42 (1989).
222. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
223. Id. at 258.
224. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
225. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
226. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 298 (defining “intent” as referring to conduct taken “because
of” and not merely “in spite of” a protected characteristic). See generally McCleskey, 481
U.S. 279 (requiring specific intent).
227. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney-López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1825–26 (2000) (noting significant
examples of institutional racism in grand jury proceedings and jury selection and
proposing an institutional approach to the study of race); John A. Powell, Structural
Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 795–97 (2008).
228. See Freeman, supra note 88, at 1053.
229. Id. (discussing the “perpetrator perspective”). Indeed, a plaintiff likely would not
be able to satisfy standing prerequisites if she alleged systemic causes for a racially
disparate outcome. See generally Boddie, supra note 88 (discussing problems associated
with systemic theories in standing doctrine).
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manifest within a geographic230 and subject matter context deemed
“relevant” by the courts.231
Discrimination should also be discernible within a prescribed
period of time, as the Court has rejected remedies for harms that are
“ageless in their reach into the past.”232 These time-based limitations,
which I explore further below, are also a function of linear
conceptions of racial discrimination. Although we can link current
racial disparities to segregation from decades ago and to slavery over
a century earlier,233 the Court does not recognize these harms as a
constitutional justification for judicial remedy or even as the basis for
voluntary affirmative action.234 In each of these respects, the intent
doctrine is inconsistent with a multidimensional, systemic way of
thinking.235 Although “the world is dynamic, evolving, and
interconnected,” this doctrine principally depends on “mental models
that are static, narrow, and reductionist.”236
2. The Rejection of Systemic Theories
Constitutional doctrine has long been hostile to systemic theories
of racial discrimination. Consider Milliken v. Bradley,237 which
concerned the constitutionality of a district court order that sought to
remedy de jure segregation in Detroit public schools with a
metropolitan desegregation plan that included the city’s neighboring
white suburbs.238 The Court held that schools could not be integrated
across the city-suburb divide, unless the constitutional violation itself
also crossed municipal boundaries.239 Although proven intentional
230. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485 (1989) (rejecting
evidence of racial disparities in the construction industry generally as being outside the
“relevant market[,]” which therefore failed to justify a minority contracting program).
231. See, e.g., id. at 505 (rejecting evidence of school segregation to justify racial
considerations in minority contracting program).
232. See, e.g., In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1075
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (dismissing a claim for reparations by African-American descendants of
slaves on grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing and were time barred and that the claim
was a nonjusticiable political question).
233. See generally FEAGIN, supra note 1 (discussing how the United States was shaped
by extensive slavery and legal segregation).
234. See infra Section II.C.
235. As Sheila Foster has argued, however, intent can be demonstrated in multiple
ways, and, in some cases, equal protection allows an inference of intent based on a
showing of adverse racial impact. See Foster, supra note 30, at 1121–40.
236. See Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 11.
237. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
238. Id. at 717–18.
239. See id. at 761–62.
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discrimination by the Detroit school board—and a state law that
exacerbated racial segregation240—helped to instigate white flight,241
the Court refused to attribute these racial practices to a constitutional
wrong.242 In so doing, the Court insulated a cross-jurisdictional system
that effectuated racial segregation. As the theory of adaptive
discrimination would predict, the ramifications of the Court’s decision
reverberate even today in the Detroit area, where wrenching racial
inequality has intensified.243
Similarly in Missouri v. Jenkins,244 the Court concluded that a
federal court order designed to facilitate interdistrict desegregation
exceeded the court’s remedial authority to remedy an intradistrict
violation.245 The Court’s power was limited to “restoring victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in
the absence of such conduct.”246 Reflecting longstanding assumptions
that discrimination is transactional and discrete, rather than dynamic
and multifaceted, the Court considered it dispositive that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove a “causal” relationship between
intentional segregation by the Kansas City school district and
segregation in the surrounding area.247 The Court’s decision not only
stymied metropolitan desegregation efforts in the wake of white
flight, but, along with Milliken, elevated the jurisdictional boundary
as another constitutional barrier to systemic redress.
3. The Myth of the “Private” and the “Public” as Distinctive Spheres
As discussed earlier, public and private practices have created
and perpetuated racial discrimination across and within multiple
spheres. For example, federal, state, and local laws all facilitated and

240. See id. at 726–27 (discussing the district court’s finding that the state committed
constitutional violations by failing to provide students in Detroit the same “full range of
state-supported transportation” as was provided to “many neighboring, mostly white []
suburban districts” and by acting to “impede, delay, and minimize racial integration in
Detroit schools” (citing Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 589 (E.D. Mich. 1971))).
241. See id. at 724–26.
242. As Professor David Troutt writes, this decoupling of private and public action was
contrary to conventional local thinking about racial segregation across the city-suburb
divide. See PRICE OF PARADISE, supra note 91, at 109. For some Detroit residents who
participated in a focus group, “the relationship between Detroit’s tradition of segregated
schools and white flight to its suburbs was as close as cause and effect.” Id.
243. See id. at 110–11.
244. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
245. Id. at 92.
246. Id. at 88 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)).
247. Id. at 95–96.
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encouraged white flight from central cities to the suburbs,248 creating
conditions that private landlords in the central cities then exploited in
ways that exacerbated housing discrimination.249 When black students
began to enroll in public schools that were formerly segregated by
law, many white students fled to private, all-white academies,
intensifying the racial isolation of blacks in public education.250 These
public-private connections are also evident in criminal justice, as law
enforcement officials have ruthlessly punished perceived infractions
of the white social order.251
Equal protection doctrine forces lower courts and litigants to
ignore this context.252 I discuss one aspect of this problem below in the
area of school desegregation.253 In these cases, the Court has limited
federal judicial authority to remedy persistent segregation based on
time-centered presumptions that racial segregation is attributable to
private, “natural” preferences,254 rather than being the consequence
248. See JACKSON, supra note 126, at 196–99.
249. See, e.g., SATTER, supra note 179, at 40 (exploring the role that the real estate
industry played in perpetuating substandard housing for blacks in Chicago and
exacerbating housing discrimination).
250. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); see also Boddie, supra note 88, at 350.
251. See KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 88 (“During the age of segregation, authorities
used the criminal law to impose a stigmatizing code of conduct upon Negroes, one that
demanded exhibitions of servility and the open disavowal of any desire for equality.”); id.
at 90 (“During the Jim Crow era, officials also used criminal law to reimpose involuntary
servitude upon blacks.”); see also BLACKMON, supra note 69, at 7 (describing the
economic system of forced labor that resulted in the kidnapping and reenslavement of
thousands of blacks for the benefit and profit of national private industry); id. (“By 1900,
the South’s judicial system had been wholly reconfigured to make one of its primary
purposes the coercion of African Americans to comply with the social customs and labor
demands of whites.”).
252. We might also treat this as a problem with the state action doctrine, which fails to
acknowledge the synergies between private and public discrimination.
253. See infra Section II.C.2.a (discussing school desegregation cases); see also
Freeman, supra note 88, at 1072 (“Racial discrimination is thus wrenched from its social
fabric and becomes a mere question of private, individual taste.”). But see City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing a
theory of how government “passive[ly] participa[tes]” in private discrimination).
254. Some federal courts in an earlier era, however, acknowledged the relationship
between private “preferences” and public policies that had actively promoted segregation.
For example, one federal district judge attributed the segregative housing choices of vast
numbers of white families to the Chicago Housing Authority’s intentionally discriminatory
housing practices. Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
aff’d, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970). The district court concluded that the decision by
“188,000 White families eligible for public housing . . . to forego their opportunity to
obtain low cost housing rather than to move into all Negro projects in all Negro
neighborhoods” was the “predictable result” of the housing authority’s “segregationist
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of past government actions, which have fostered and enabled private
discriminatory behavior.255
4. Colorblindness and “Societal Discrimination”
Colorblindness principles in equal protection further corrupt our
understanding of racial discrimination and blind the courts to its
many permutations. For example, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,256 the Supreme Court struck down a university’s
affirmative action policy that was designed to open opportunities to
people of color in higher education as a response to widespread racial
disparities and general historical discrimination.257 For the Court,
however, the university’s goal of remedying “societal discrimination”
was too “amorphous,” “ageless in its reach into the past,” and
unconnected to “specific[,]” identified racial wrongdoing.258 Only
particularized discrimination could justify race-specific affirmative
action policies.259 Moreover, any such use of race triggered the most
rigorous judicial review.260 For some time, this standard nearly always
resulted in the invalidation of the challenged policy.261

policy.” Id. The court similarly interpreted demographic “trends” that concentrated blacks
in the central city and that led to white flight into the surrounding suburbs. Id.; see also
Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 937–38 (7th Cir. 1974) (discussing the
necessity of a metropolitan-wide remedy involving siting of public housing in the
surrounding suburbs), aff’d sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Rather than
explaining these residential patterns as the “natural” by-product of racially neutral
preferences, as the Supreme Court would do in its later school desegregation decisions,
the district court used them to demonstrate the importance of redoubling remedial efforts.
See Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 915; infra Section II.C.2.a. It warned of a “desperately
intensifying division of Whites and Negroes in Chicago” if these “existing patterns of
residential separation” were not reversed. Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 915.
255. See Ford, supra note 19, at 1845 (“[R]acially identified space results from public
policy and legal sanctions—in short, from state action—rather than being the unfortunate
but irremediable consequence of purely private or individual choices.”); cf. Keyes v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973) (“Intentional school segregation in the past may have
been a factor in creating a natural environment for the growth of further segregation.”).
256. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
257. Id. at 307; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 736, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion) (striking down the voluntary use of a racebased student assignment plan to remedy de facto segregation).
258. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 291.
261. Indeed, in Adarand v. Pena, Justice O’Connor sought to “dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’ ” 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (plurality
opinion).
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Similarly, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,262 the Court
rejected a minority contracting program on the grounds that its goal
of improving opportunities for minorities rested on “generalized”
assertions of past discrimination in the construction industry as a
whole.263 The Court concluded that plaintiffs’ failure to define the
“precise scope” of their injury doomed the remedy to having “no
logical stopping point.”264 Observing that such an “ill-defined
wrong”265 might be used to “justify race-based decision-making [that
was] essentially limitless in scope and duration,” the Court struck
down the program.266 The majority rebuffed arguments, propounded
by Justice Marshall in dissent,267 that city officials sought to redress
racial discrimination in enacting the local program.268 The Court
determined that evidence of such racial disparities was immaterial
because it was outside the “relevant,” locally defined market.269

262. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
263. Id. at 498.
264. Id.; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 310–11 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns about the duration of racial considerations).
265. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing “that the city's leadership is
deeply familiar with . . . racial discrimination” and “[has] spent long years witnessing
multifarious acts of discrimination [in voting, school desegregation, and housing]”). In
seeking to justify the city’s affirmative action policy, Justice Marshall also advanced a
more sophisticated understanding of the connections between private discrimination and
the state:
The majority is wrong to trivialize the continuing impact of government
acceptance or use of private institutions or structures once wrought by
discrimination. When government channels all its contracting funds to a whitedominated community of established contractors whose racial homogeneity is the
product of private discrimination, it does more than place its imprimatur on the
practices which forged and which continue to define that community. It also
provides a measurable boost to those economic entities that have thrived within it,
while denying important economic benefits to those entities which, but for prior
discrimination, might well be better qualified to receive valuable government
contracts.
Id. at 538.
268. Id. at 505 (majority opinion) (“The ‘evidence’ relied upon by the dissent, the
history of school desegregation in Richmond and numerous congressional reports, does
little to define the scope of any injury to minority contractors in Richmond or the
necessary remedy. The factors relied upon by the dissent could justify a preference of any
size or duration.”).
269. Id. at 485. In Adarand v. Pena, the Court extended the same rigorous standard of
judicial review to the use of affirmative action in federal programs, imposing strict scrutiny
on race-conscious efforts to increase the ranks of persons of color in the contracting
industry. 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (plurality opinion). Not until Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
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In these cases and others,270 the Court has dismissed widespread
racial disparities as a justification for race-conscious remedies because
there is no causal connection to intentional discrimination.271 This
“societal” discrimination is so pervasive that the Court has placed it
beyond the reach of constitutional remedy, much like a metastatic
cancer that cannot be treated because its origins are either unknown
or unknowable. In sum, constitutional law has created a framework
that deems affirmative action programs, used to promote racial
inclusion, as doctrinally suspect. Yet it gives a free pass to adaptive
discrimination that fosters and entrenches racial inequality.
B.

Early Civil Rights Cases that Acknowledged Adaptive Forms of
Discrimination

For a very limited time in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court curbed state and local government
efforts to circumvent civil rights mandates. Lower federal courts also
vigorously enforced judicial remedies against obvious governmental
resistance.272 As discussed earlier, adaptive strategies used by
government officials included the use of alternative discriminatory
structures to condition access to education, such as all-white private
schools and “freedom of choice” plans that perpetuated segregation
by deferring to white preferences for white schools.273

U.S. 306 (2003) (plurality opinion), did the Court uphold a race-conscious admissions
policy that was designed to promote the educational benefits of diversity. Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 343–44. And even then the Court was careful to distinguish this narrow justification
from the broader “societal discrimination” rationale that had been rejected in Bakke. See
id. at 323–24.
270. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
731 (2007) (plurality opinion) (“The sweep of the mandate claimed by the district is
contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal discrimination does not justify raceconscious government action.”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (applying strict scrutiny to
affirmative action in federal contracting); J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (affirmative action
in municipal contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986)
(arguing that racial classifications must have an exact connection with their justifications).
271. See, e.g., In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 780–81
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (dismissing reparations claims on multiple grounds, including standing and
the political question doctrine), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 471 F.3d 754 (7th
Cir. 2006).
272. See infra text accompanying notes 353–55.
273. See supra Section I.A; cf. Boddie, supra note 88, at 349–52 (describing
unsuccessful efforts to challenge federal tax exemptions to private, discriminatory white
schools, which undermined public school desegregation).
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The Supreme Court addressed some dimensions of this problem
in Green v. County School Board.274 The Court struck down a
“freedom of choice” plan adopted by a local school district in rural
Virginia that had been segregated by law.275 The district consisted of
just two schools, one that had been assigned to black students; the
other that had been designated for white students.276 When the district
was ordered to desegregate, the state of Virginia passed laws that,
while omitting any express references to race, were obviously
intended to achieve the same segregative result.277 One state law
divested local school boards of the authority to assign children to
schools, reserving that power to the state instead.278 Under the law,
students were “automatically reassigned” to the school they had
attended during the previous year.279 New students were assigned a
school selected by the state.280
Predictably, the previous racial patterns persisted. Over ten years
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, “not a single white
child” had chosen to attend the black school, and eighty-five percent
of the black children in the system still attended the all-black
school.281 Against the context of longstanding state-mandated
segregation, the Court declared the plan an unconstitutional effort to
perpetuate the prior de jure system,282 despite its formal prohibition
against the intentional exclusion of black children.283 It directed the
school district to eliminate the vestiges of the prior state-enforced
system “root and branch”284 and to devise a plan that “promise[d]
realistically to work, and promise[d] realistically to work now.”285
Although the Court did not use the precise language of adaptive
discrimination, it plainly conceptualized the school desegregation
problem in those terms. It observed that “time and flexibility” would
be required to “dismantl[e]” “well-entrenched dual systems” given

274. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
275. Id. at 441.
276. Id. at 432.
277. Id. at 432–33 (referring to statutes “enacted by Virginia in resistance” to Brown).
278. Id. at 433.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 441.
282. Id. at 438 (describing the “freedom of choice” plan as a “deliberate perpetuation
of the unconstitutional dual system”).
283. Id. at 441.
284. Id. at 438.
285. Id. at 439.
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the “complex and multifaceted problems [that] would arise.”286
Accordingly, it placed the burden on the school district to establish
that its proposed plan would provide “meaningful and immediate
progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation.”287 It
further determined that the district court “should retain jurisdiction
until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely
removed.”288
South Carolina v. Katzenbach289 provides another useful example
of the Court’s prior willingness to check adaptive techniques,
specifically in the context of minority voting.290 For one-hundred
years after the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, racial
discrimination in voting remained deeply entrenched in the South.291
Government officials routinely developed new strategies for
circumventing federal court orders and legislative mandates that
barred discrimination.292 All-white primaries excluded blacks and
Latinos from electoral participation, as did poll taxes and literacy
tests.293 When these were outlawed or struck down, public officials
devised other discriminatory methods to replace them.294 These
innovations did not deny access to the ballot outright, but they had
the comparable effect of weakening minority voting power.295 Atlarge voting schemes and the annexation of predominantly white
areas to majority-black ones were commonly used to dilute the
286. See id. at 437.
287. Id. at 439.
288. Id.
289. 383 U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631
(2013) (holding the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act to be
unconstitutionally outdated).
290. See id. at 308.
291. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619–20 (2013); KEYSSAR, supra note
103, at 216. These problems are in other parts of the country as well. See Shelby Cty., 133
S. Ct. at 2620.
292. See MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 103, at 2.
293. Id. at 3.
294. See Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The
Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1330–31 (2005) (discussing minority vote dilution);
Nina Perales, Luis Figueroa & Criselda G. Rivas, Voting Rights in Texas: 1982–2006, 17 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 713, 713–14 (2008) (discussing strategies used to suppress the
minority vote in Texas); see also MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 103, at 12 (noting
that some discriminatory responses to increased minority voting succeeded despite the
Voting Rights Act); Freeman, supra note 88, at 1082 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, VOTING IN MISSISSIPPI 10 (1965) (noting that many efforts to increase black
voter participation in the the 1960s South were ultimately unsuccessful)).
295. See Nina Perales, Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 10 (2014).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

1284

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

minority vote.296 By adapting their techniques, these jurisdictions
successfully evaded enforcement.
Plaintiffs could always challenge these tactics in court, of course,
but litigation was a slow, expensive, and often ineffective remedy, as
the resulting discrimination irreparably skewed election outcomes.297
As soon as federal courts barred one form of voting discrimination,
another form of discrimination surfaced in its place. Plaintiffs could
not sue—and the courts could not move—fast enough to keep up with
the problem.
Congress passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act in response. The
Act contained mechanisms that targeted recidivist jurisdictions with
records of repeated voting discrimination and required them to secure
federal approval before they could adopt new voting requirements.298
In Katzenbach, the Supreme Court squarely rejected a constitutional
challenge to these provisions, taking explicit account of the adaptive
aspects of voting discrimination that had precipitated the Act.299 In
upholding these provisions under Congress’s constitutional authority
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court noted the
“unremitting and ingenious defiance” of the covered jurisdictions,
which stubbornly sought to defy constitutional and statutory bans on
intentional racial discrimination.300 It concluded that such provisions
were critical for curbing discrimination before it could mutate and
take root in a different form.
C.

The Hidden Role of Time

The previous Section explored decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court at the height of its commitment to civil rights, when it
was prepared to support a more robust role for the federal courts and
Congress in policing adaptive forms of discrimination. In these early

296. See, e.g., MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 103, at 2. Other techniques that
appeared race-neutral were in fact designed to frustrate minority voters. When the
Supreme Court struck down the poll tax in 1966, Texas immediately legislated an annual
voter registration requirement that made it harder to vote. See Robert W. Doty, The Texas
Voter Registration Law and the Due Process Clause, 7 HOUS. L. REV. 163, 163 (1969).
297. See sources cited supra note 294.
298. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2635 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(observing that the Voting Rights Act sought to redress “second-generation barriers” to
voting, such as racial gerrymandering, the discriminatory use of at-large voting, and the
annexation of majority-white areas that were designed to dilute minority voting strength).
299. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
300. Id. at 309.
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cases the Court was far more willing than in later cases to infer a
racially discriminatory motive.301 As discussed below, that readiness
to attribute racially disparate outcomes to discriminatory intent later
faded. What accounts for this shift?
This Section attributes the Court’s recent decisions to an
assumption that discrimination ceases to be constitutionally
cognizable after a certain period of time—in other words, that it
expires (rather than adapts), at which point it is beyond constitutional
remedy. Here I explore the role that time plays in constitutional
determinations about the legitimacy of legislative and judicial
remedies. I contend that the Court’s misplaced focus on time has led
it to disregard discrimination’s adaptive qualities.
We can understand the origins of the problem by returning to the
precepts of adaptive discrimination. Given basic human tendencies,
judges interpret constitutional law using shortcuts to make sense of
the complex systems and operations that create racial discrimination.
These temporal constructs, however, limit their understanding. As a
result, they are more likely to presume that time severs the “causal”
relationship between prior intentional discrimination and current
racial disparities. As a result, litigation outcomes in discrimination
cases often depend on a hidden contest over the significance of time.
This happens in two ways. First, litigants debate the relationship
of past racial discrimination to current racial disparities.302 Second, in
addition to the historical record, existing doctrine implicitly demands
a focus on how much time has passed since the initial constitutional
violation. The length of elapsed time is used to assess the
decisionmaker’s underlying racial motivation and, therefore, the
constitutional necessity of ongoing race-based remedies. This last use
of time is particularly problematic. As a heuristic, it masks and
confuses the way that racial discrimination operates.

301. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 99–100 (discussing the apparent
racial motivation in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
302. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 731 (2014) (noting the Shelby County majority’s
“ahistoricism”); Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of History, 44 U. MEM. L. REV.
357, 362 (2013) (discussing “the importance of looking to past conditions to evaluate
present circumstances”).
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1. The Civil Rights Cases
Decided in 1883, the Civil Rights Cases offer one early example
of the time problem in constitutional doctrine. The Court’s decision
struck down congressional legislation passed in 1875 that prohibited
private racial discrimination in public accommodations.303 The Court’s
conclusion that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers under
the Thirteenth Amendment in passing the public accommodations
law is most interesting for present purposes. The Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery,304 unquestionably reaches
private conduct.305 The Court concluded that Congress’s powers
extended beyond state laws “establishing or upholding slavery”306 and
embraced an affirmative mandate to “establish[] and decree[]
universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States.”307
It further determined that Congress’s authority to enforce these
freedoms included the “right to enact all necessary and proper laws
for the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and
incidents.”308
This expansive reading of the Thirteenth Amendment would
seem to suggest that congressional power reached private
discrimination at least in places of public accommodation. But here
the Court pivoted to a more formalistic understanding: the
“incidents” of slavery had nothing to do with the denial of public
accommodation on the basis of race.309 Access to privately owned
places of public accommodation was not a “fundamental right” of

303. The Court concluded that the law exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 27–28 (1883). Moreover, the Court
determined that private discrimination was not “state” action and, therefore, lay beyond
Congress’s powers to enforce laws against discrimination by governmental actors. Id. at
21–23.
304. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 27–28 (“[T]he
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolishes slavery . . . declares ‘that neither slavery, nor
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction;’ and it gives Congress power to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation.”).
305. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30 (“Under the Thirteenth Amendment the
legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and
involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals,
whether sanctioned by State legislation or not.”).
306. Id. at 28.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See id. at 31.
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citizenship, but a “social right”310 that lay beyond Congress’s
enforcement jurisdiction.311
Most importantly for our purposes, the Court’s conclusion
betrayed its impatience with the asserted connection between the
denial of public accommodation and slavery:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the
ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.312
It is worth pausing here to observe the boldness of the Court’s
assertion, not even two decades after the formal end313 of the Civil
War and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, that “at some
stage” blacks would have to cease being the “special favorite of the
law.” The notion that blacks somehow enjoyed favored status—and
that such status, having been conferred, had already run out—is
astonishing in its own right. But the Court’s flat, one-dimensional
characterization of slavery and its “inseparable concomitants” is also
fully consistent with what we know about constitutional law over a
century later: it propounds the view that the effects of discrimination
necessarily diminish as time wears on. Because discrimination
recedes, so too should any remedies designed to redress it. Only such
a notion could explain the Court’s blindness to the intergenerational
damage that slavery had wrought and its highly strained
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment guarantee.
2. How Time Influences Determinations of Racial Motive
The next two Sections turn to school desegregation cases and to
Shelby County. Many scholars have attributed the outcomes in the
school cases to concerns about the institutional competence of the
federal judiciary to manage longstanding desegregation efforts and to

310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
See Gregory P. Downs, Opinion, The Dangerous Myth of Appomattox, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/opinion/sunday/the-dangerousmyth-of-appomattox.html [https://perma.cc/M98Z-8V4W] (explaining that the Civil War
continued beyond the formal ceasefire).
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the virtues of local control.314 Similarly, Shelby County can be framed
as a decision about federalism and the Court’s conservative
commitment to protecting state sovereignty.315 These Sections do not
discount any of these explanations. Rather, they offer another
framework for understanding these cases and expose the assumptions
about time that linger beneath their surface. Understanding the
hidden role of time can also explain how measures that were designed
to unwind generations of discrimination become constitutionally
suspect.316 My point is that the legitimacy of such measures is highly
sensitive to the passage of time: the more time that has passed, the
less justifiable they are in the eyes of the Court.
Here we can connect time to another problem that occupies
constitutional law: assessing the role that racial motive plays in
government action.317 In an early article, Paul Brest explained how
the passage of time bears on judicial determinations of illicit
motive.318 As Brest conceived the problem, the chronology and
sequence of underlying events are important factors.319 This is
because intentional discrimination follows a conventional path: “the
decisionmaker enforces a discriminatory operative rule; a court
enjoins this practice; the decisionmaker then adopts a constitutionally

314. See Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two
Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 480 (1999) (describing the “increased importance in
returning school districts to ‘local control’ ” in school desegregation cases).
315. Cf. James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty
and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote, Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 39, 43 (2014) (“[Shelby County] is not based on a violation of any specific
provision of the Constitution at all. Instead, the majority holds that Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act is unconstitutional because . . . it violates not a Constitutional imperative but a
mere ‘tradition’: ‘our historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.’ ”
(quoting Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2621, 2621 (2013))); Hasen, supra note 302, at
744–45 (describing the Court’s majority opinion in Shelby County as the product of “Chief
Justice Roberts’s longer-term project to bring constitutional jurisprudence in line with his
conservative political vision while seeking to project the aura of modest technocratic
justices simply doing their jobs”).
316. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
317. See Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A
Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 880 (1985) (“[The Court has
embraced enthusiastically reviewing the purpose for which an official act was taken as a
critical factor in determining the action’s constitutionality.”).
318. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 122.
319. See id. (“The juxtaposition of a decision with some prior event or sequence of
events often bears on the inference of illicit motivation.”); see also Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Met. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (identifying a circumstantial
“sequence of events” factor within the broader inquiry into discriminatory intent).
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‘innocent’ rule that effectively maintains the status quo.”320 A
decisionmaker’s “past behavior[,]” Brest wrote, “usually justifies the
court’s strong suspicion of his motives.”321
This account captures the dynamics of the cases described above,
in which intransigent governmental officials in the aftermath of
Brown resisted integration mandates under the auspices of formally
race-neutral practices.322 Time is central to the Court’s judgment of
racial motivation—it explains why in Green323 and Katzenbach324 the
Court was willing to acknowledge and curb adaptive practices, but
retreated in subsequent decades.
And yet, the presumption that time inoculates us against racial
discrimination is inconsistent with history and experience. The fault
rests again with the linear conceptions of racial discrimination that
underlie Brest’s model. This model focuses on governmental officials
with a record of past discriminatory behavior who then promote raceneutral policies with racially harmful outcomes. Under Brest’s
formulation, this official conduct is presumptively suspicious because
of the chronology and sequence of their actions.325 This is a
reasonable assumption, but it also implies that racial discrimination
subsides as new decisionmakers come on board and the more devout
racists leave the scene.326 In other words, it ignores the lessons of
history—that racial discrimination has been “handed down” through

320. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 122.
321. Id. at 127.
322. Id. at 123 (“The sequence of events may thus support the inference that the
decisionmaker’s objective was to do covertly that which he was forbidden to do overtly.”).
323. The Green Court also referenced time in its decision, but placed time on the side
of the plaintiffs in its determination that the school board’s “freedom of choice” plan was
unconstitutional. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (“In determining
whether respondent School Board met [the command to disestablish its prior dual system]
by adopting its ‘freedom-of-choice’ plan, it is relevant that this first step did not come until
some 11 years after Brown I was decided and 10 years after Brown II directed the making
of a ‘prompt and reasonable start.’ ”).
324. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (“After enduring
nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might
well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to
its victims.”), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
325. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 126 (discussing the problem of
disguised illicit motivation by a repeat offender).
326. Cf. id. (“Sometimes a material change of circumstances, or the passage of time
accompanied by a change of community attitudes, will be persuasive of the
decisionmaker’s good faith.”).
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the generations.327 If experience is our guide, we have far less of a
basis to presume good faith in matters of race.
We can see the influence of Brest’s theory in equal protection
doctrine. For example, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.328 the Court considered whether a village
acted unconstitutionally in refusing to rezone a parcel of land to
accommodate racially integrated, low-income housing.329 The Court
rejected the equal protection claim, concluding that there was nothing
in the “specific sequence of events” that led up to the challenged
decision or “departures from the normal procedural sequence” that
gave rise to the inference of an improper motive.330 Nor was there
anything suspicious in the “contemporaneous statements by members
of the decisionmaking body.”331 Therefore, the Court perceived no
need for further constitutional inquiry.
Still, the refusal to rezone bore all the hallmarks of adaptive
discrimination. The town’s decision bore more heavily on racial
minorities.332 And, perhaps most critically, racial segregation was
particularly acute in the village relative to the surrounding area.333 Of
its 64,000 residents, only 27 were black.334 There was good reason to
327. See FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 36 (“For systemic racism to persist across so many
generations, white individuals and small groups have had to participate actively in the
ongoing collective and discriminatory reproduction of the family, community, legal,
political, economic, educational, and religious institutions that undergird this inegalitarian
system.”).
328. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
329. Id. at 254–55.
330. Id. at 267.
331. Id. at 268.
332. Id. at 269.
333. As the Arlington Heights respondents noted in their brief to the Court:
[T]he massive growth in population in Arlington Heights in the past two decades
has, with rare exceptions, been limited to whites. Of Arlington Heights’ 1970
population of 64,884, 27, or less than 0.1 percent, were black. Arlington Heights is
the most residentially segregated community and has the most racially
exclusionary housing stock in the Chicago metropolitan area among the
municipalities with more than 50,000 residents.
Brief for the Respondents, Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (No. 75-616), 1976 WL 181306, at *12 (internal citations omitted). The respondents
further noted that this pattern contrasted sharply with the racial demographics of the
Chicago metropolitan area. See id. at *13 (“The number and percentage of blacks [in the
area] rose substantially during the 1960s. While their numbers grew, however, almost all
minority persons in the Chicago area were still confined to segregated Chicago
neighborhoods in 1970.” (internal citations omitted)).
334. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255. Some local constituents appeared to object to
the development on racial grounds. Id. at 269.
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be suspicious that the town’s zoning decision itself was racially
motivated, but the time data in the Court’s estimation did not support
the inference.335
Thus, in Arlington Heights, time implicitly drives the
constitutional analysis. The Court more readily detects covert racial
motive if it manifests close in time to prior overt discrimination. In
the absence of such evidence, however, the Court is more likely to
presume good faith, weakening the constitutional basis for legislative
and judicial remedies and even for voluntary affirmative action.336 As
a result, adaptive discrimination goes unchecked.
The cases discussed below illustrate different dimensions of the
same problem. Because of the passage of time, the Court is unwilling
to presume illicit racial motivation. In the school desegregation
context, the time problem has led the Court to adopt standards that
make it easier to terminate federal jurisdiction over long-running
cases. In Shelby County, the Court invoked time to invalidate a core
provision of the Voting Rights Act that curbed adaptive forms of
voting discrimination. Once again, the Court relied on linear
conceptions of racial discrimination by placing racial intent at the
center of the constitutional analysis and then advancing time concerns
to avoid finding intent. Both of these constitutional choices obscure
the presence of adaptive discrimination.
a.

School Desegregation

A key constitutional question in school desegregation cases has
been the scope of a federal district court’s equitable authority to
retain jurisdiction in cases brought to eliminate the vestiges of stateenforced segregation in public schools.337 I contend that the standard
set by the Court to govern the scope of federal judicial oversight has
been influenced by its sense of time. Specifically, it uses time to
absolve formerly de jure segregated districts of responsibility for
ongoing racial disparities, attributing them to private “preferences,”
335. See Metro. Dev. Hous. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294
(7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the Village’s refusal to rezone, assuming a proper showing
of discriminatory effect, violated the Fair Housing Act under a disparate impact analysis).
336. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 123 (“The strength of the inference
will also be affected by the tenacity of the decisionmaker’s past commitment to the
forbidden rule, the extent to which the innovation marks a departure from traditionally
established practices, and the existence of other decisions that seem designed to serve the
same illicit objective.”).
337. See Parker, supra note 314, at 524–28 (discussing the importance of equitable
discretion in school desegregation cases).
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rather than to the school’s prior intentional segregation. The Court
achieves this by declaring that the passage of time has severed the
causal relationship between past racial intent and current racial
inequality.
Board of Education v. Dowell338 illustrates the point. It is worth
some effort to unpack the case’s chronology to show that, as in the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court exaggerates time in its rush to terminate
judicial supervision. In 1961, black students and their parents sued the
Oklahoma City school board to end de jure segregation in the public
schools.339 The district court concluded that the city “had intentionally
segregated both schools and housing” and that the board, by design,
continued to operate a segregated school system.340 When the district
court ordered the school district to desegregate, the board shifted to a
“neighborhood zoning” plan.341 Because of persistent residential
segregation, the plan failed to promote integration.342 Therefore, the
district court in 1972 ordered the school district to adopt more
aggressive measures, including busing for both black and white
students.343
Five years later, in 1977, the school board successfully moved to
terminate the case.344 As the district’s racial composition changed due
to white flight,345 the school board returned to its old neighborhood
student assignment plan,346 which further entrenched school
segregation.347 In 1984, plaintiffs moved to reopen litigation.348 The
district court denied plaintiffs’ motion and vacated the desegregation
decree.349 Critically for our purposes, the court concluded that
338. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
339. Id. at 240.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. (“In 1965, the District Court found that the School Board’s attempt to
desegregate by using neighborhood zoning failed to remedy past segregation because
residential segregation resulted in one-race schools.”).
343. Id. at 241.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 242 (noting that young black students were being bused increasingly longer
distances due to shifting demographics, meaning that whites were moving to the outer
reaches of the city).
346. Id.
347. Id. (“Under the [neighborhood zoning plan], 11 of 64 elementary schools would
be greater than 90% Black, 22 would be greater than 90% White plus other minorities,
and 31 would be racially mixed.”).
348. Id. at 243 (noting that while the district court had “terminated” the case, it had not
dissolved the injunctive decree it had entered in 1972).
349. Id.
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“present residential segregation”—which under the school board’s
neighborhood assignment plan ensured a greater percentage of
racially segregated schools—was not a product of prior de jure
segregation.350 Rather, it was the result of “private decisionmaking
and economics” and, therefore, “was too attenuated” to be traceable
to the school board’s previous, unconstitutional acts.351 The lower
court further determined that the board’s neighborhood assignment
plan had “not been designed with discriminatory intent,” a conclusion
that would prove central to the question of whether the district court
could continue to exercise its equitable jurisdiction over the case.352
The question before the Supreme Court was highly technical, but
important. It concerned whether the district court had applied too
lenient a standard for dissolving the desegregation decree.353 On
review of the district court’s decision, the court of appeals enunciated
a standard that was far more stringent. “[A] desegregation decree
remains in effect,” the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded,
“until a school district can show ‘grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions,’ ”354 and “dramatic changes in conditions
unforeseen at the time of the decree that . . . impose extreme and
unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the obligor.”355
The more rigorous standard was central to the disposition of the
case. By requiring the district court to continue its supervision of the
school district’s desegregation efforts, the higher standard would have
meant more integrative measures for Oklahoma City’s public schools.
The court of appeals determined that the board’s neighborhood
assignment plan would lead to resegregation and that “circumstances
in Oklahoma City had not changed enough to justify modification of
the decree.”356
Although the court of appeals did not use the terminology of
adaptive discrimination, its decision to hold the lower court to a more
demanding standard acknowledged the problem. By requiring a
heightened showing of school board compliance and “dramatic
changes in conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree,” the court

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
1989)).
356.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 243–44.
Id. at 244 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
Id. (quoting Dowell ex rel. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir.
Id.
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of appeals acknowledged the systemic, dynamic, and regenerative
nature of racial discrimination. In the appellate court’s view, a more
exacting approach—and one that would undoubtedly lengthen the
district court’s continued involvement in the case—was necessary for
excavating longstanding patterns of racial separation.357 In other
words, segregation required remedial efforts that were worthy of its
metastatic qualities.358
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the more demanding
standard. Instead, it concluded that a district court could
constitutionally release a local school board from continuing
oversight upon a showing that the board “had complied in good faith
with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and that the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable.”359 The Court emphasized that “federal supervision of
local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy
past discrimination.”360 Once local authorities have complied with a
desegregation decree “for a reasonable period of time,” then it is
appropriate for the local school board to resume control of its
operations.361 The Court further observed that the “test espoused by
the Court of Appeals would condemn a school district, once governed
by a board which intentionally discriminated, to judicial tutelage for
the indefinite future.”362
The Dowell formulation made time a key factor for assessing the
district court’s equitable discretion to modify desegregation
decrees.363 It rested on the assumption that the passage of time cures
the constitutional violation and that any remaining segregation must
be due to private preferences or to racially “neutral” demographic
357. Id.
358. See generally Parker, supra note 314, at 479–80 (calling for judges to exercise more
robust remedial discretion in school desegregation cases).
359. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–50. However, the burden is on the school district to make
this showing. Id.
360. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
361. Id. at 248.
362. Id. at 249. The Court has cautioned against indiscriminate reliance on history
alone as the justification for remedial measures that have “no logical stopping point” in
the context of voluntary integration, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 760 (2007), and in the context of affirmative action in
contracting, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
363. See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1091, 1093–94 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(“[A]s the school desegregation cases instruct us, federal court supervision of local
government operations should be a ‘temporary measure to remedy past discrimination’
and is ‘not intended to operate in perpetuity.’ ” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 247, 248 (1991))).
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changes. With segregation no longer attributable to the perpetrator, it
is absolved of any continuing responsibility. As in the Civil Rights
Cases, the Court overlooked the systemic and dynamic aspects of
racial discrimination. Residential segregation had been “set by law for
a period in excess of fifty years.”364 The notion that segregation in
Oklahoma City would be fixed in the short five-year period—from
the adoption of the 1972 decree, which mandated more aggressive
integrative measures, to 1977, when the case was terminated—defies
our understanding of how discrimination operates.365 The very idea
reflects an assumption that discrimination ceases once it is declared
unconstitutional.
In Freeman v. Pitts,366 another school desegregation case, the
Court applied Dowell’s weaker standard to hold that a district court
could constitutionally release a school district from its supervision in
incremental stages, before the district had fully eliminated the
vestiges of prior discrimination in all facets of its operations.367 As in
Dowell, the Court’s inordinate focus on time clouded its ability to
perceive segregation’s adaptive qualities and how easily it could
spread across a school system.368 “As the de jure violation becomes
more remote in time,” the Court observed, “it becomes less likely that
a current racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior
de jure system.”369 Justice Scalia was more pointed in his observations.
“At some time,” he noted in his concurring opinion, “we must
acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without any
further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days
when Lyndon Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an
appreciable effect upon current operation of schools.”370 Once again,

364. Brief for Respondents, Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (No. 89-1080),
1993 WL 340969, at *6.
365. Cf. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968) (“It is against this background
that 13 years after Brown II commanded the abolition of dual systems we must measure
the effectiveness of respondent School Board’s ‘freedom-of-choice’ plan to achieve that
end.”).
366. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
367. Id. at 490–91.
368. For example, by focusing singularly on whether the district had eliminated
discrimination in student assignment, it neglected to examine the dynamic interaction
between student and faculty assignment. See, e.g., id. at 498.
369. Id. at 496.
370. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

1296

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

the Court assumed that time naturally purged racially discriminatory
attitudes and behavior.371
b.

Shelby County v. Holder

As discussed earlier, the 1965 Voting Rights Act responded to
“ingenious and unremitting defiance” of southern states determined
to deny voting rights—and thus political power—to African
Americans. In enacting this law, Congress looked first to identify
those jurisdictions “uniquely characterized by voting discrimination
‘on a pervasive scale’ ” and then to subject them to more stringent
federal remedies.372 While not all of the areas necessarily used the
same suppressive voting techniques, Congress understood the
adaptive nature of voting discrimination that operated in the South
and other regions. Importantly, Congress determined that
jurisdictions with the most persistent records of discrimination tended
to share two characteristics: (1) low rates of voter participation and
registration and (2) the use of tests or devices that were transparently
designed to prevent blacks from voting.373
Congress designed the resulting “coverage” provision to
disrupt voting discrimination and to curb the use of evasive measures
in the jurisdictions that satisfied these criteria. A separate
“preclearance” provision required these covered areas to secure
federal approval prior to adopting any changes to their voting laws.374
Thus, Congress “reverse engineered” the coverage provision by
adopting a metric that ensured repeat offenders would be subject to
federal oversight and supervision.375 This approach allowed Congress
to take direct aim at the ways in which voting policies and practices
371. Id. at 491–92 (majority opinion) (“[W]ith the passage of time, the degree to which
racial imbalances continue to represent vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish,
and the practicability and efficacy of various remedies can be evaluated with more
precision.”).
372. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013).
373. The provision applied if the jurisdiction had used racially discriminatory tests or
other “devices” as a voting prerequisite as of November 1, 1964, and if the jurisdiction had
low voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election. Id. at 2619. These “tests
or devices included literacy and knowledge tests, good moral character requirements, the
need for vouchers from registered voters and the like.” Id. Jurisdictions could “bailout”
from coverage upon showing improvement in their voting practices, and a number of
jurisdictions did bailout over the years. Id. at 2644. The Act was reauthorized in 2006.
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act (Voting Rights Act of 2006), Pub. L. No. 109-246,
120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2012)).
374. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619–20.
375. Id. at 2628.
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mutated to advance racial discrimination.376 It also usefully allowed
Congress to avoid the politically awkward situation of shaming
jurisdictions by legislating federal oversight for them by name.377 In
the heated civil rights battles, this political strategy was important.
The Shelby County Court rejected Congress’s continued reliance
on the same coverage formula used to identify discriminatory
jurisdictions in 1965.378 For the majority, several facts meant that the
formula was no longer “rational in theory or fact[:]”379 (1) registration
and turnout rates among African-American and white voters, a
source of concern at the time of the Act, now “approach parity;”380 (2)
“minority candidates hold office” at levels no one imagined in 1965;381
and (3) “blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are
rare.”382 The majority concluded that Congress could not upset the
delicate balance of power between the federal government and the
states with a formula that had not been “updated” with more recent
data.383 Therefore, the Act’s “extraordinary”384 departure from “basic
principles”385 of federalism,386 which presumed that states would
manage their own voting systems without federal interference,387 was
not constitutionally justified.388

376. Id. at 2625 (“Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where
immediate action seemed necessary.” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 328 (1966))).
377. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing this
political tactic).
378. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
379. Id. at 2625.
380. Id. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202
(2009)).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 2629.
384. Id. at 2628.
385. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring).
386. Id. (observing that if Congress “is to divide the States[,] [it] must identify those
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions”).
387. Id. at 2624 (majority opinion) (“States must beseech the Federal Government for
permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and
execute on their own . . . .”).
388. In so holding, the majority contrived a new doctrinal principle—that Congress had
infringed the “equal sovereignty” of the states by subjecting some, and not others, to
coverage under the Act. See id. But this rationale was particularly fraught given the prior
settled understanding that Congress acted at the height of its power when it sought to
remedy racial discrimination in voting. See Hasen, supra note 302, at 733 (noting
conservative law professor and former Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Michael
McConnell’s observation that the equal sovereignty principle was simply “made up”).
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Nonetheless, Congress had good reason to believe that the
coverage provision still targeted jurisdictions with the most significant
discrimination.389 Although voter registration and participation were
no longer the problems they once had been, racial discrimination in
the covered areas persisted through adaptive practices that
compromised minority voting strength in new ways.390 The legislative
record compiled by Congress in support of the Act’s reauthorization
in 2006 documented the extent of the problem.391 Overt
discrimination had subsided,392 but a range of other racially
discriminatory practices had surfaced in its place.393 The Court,
however, determined that the record was insufficient.394 It dismissed
evidence of “second-generation barriers” that did not (as in the prior
Jim Crow era) block access to the ballot, but rather only diluted “the
weight of minority votes.”395 For these Justices, focusing on such
measures did not bolster the coverage provision, but “simply
highlight[ed] [its] irrationality.”396
The Court’s inordinate focus on what it regarded as the
coverage provision’s “outdated” features illuminates core flaws in its
analysis. The provision’s crucial failing was that it relied on voting
data from 1964 and “eradicated practices”397 that had been banned
nationwide “for over forty years.”398 “[T]hings have changed
dramatically” in the “[n]early 50 years since the [Voting Rights] Act
was passed,”399 the Court observed. Because Congress had not
389. Id. at 738–42 (“[U]nder the Katzenbach rationality standard, there was ample
evidence under which Congress rationally could have concluded that racial discrimination
in voting remains a problem in covered jurisdictions . . . .”).
390. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing “second
generation barriers” to voting).
391. Id. at 2639–44 (discussing evidence of persistent racial discrimination in voting in
areas covered by the Act); see also Hasen, supra note 302, at 738–42. But Hasen, supra
note 302, at 742–43 (discussing political concerns expressed during the Act’s 2006
reauthorization about the provision’s constitutionality).
392. But see Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640–42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing to
examples of intentional discrimination in the covered jurisdictions).
393. Id. at 2635–36.
394. See Hasen, supra note 302, at 714 (noting Shelby County’s “major doctrinal and
jurisprudential change” that “demean[ed] the strength of Congress’s power to eradicate
racial discrimination in voting”).
395. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (criticizing the dissent for “rel[ying] on ‘secondgeneration [voting] barriers,’ which are not impediments to the casting of ballots, but
rather electoral arrangements that affect the weight of minority votes”).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 2627.
398. Id.; see also id. at 2625–29 (discussing the “outdated” quality of the formula).
399. Id. at 2625.
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sufficiently acknowledged that fact when it reauthorized the provision
in 2006, the Court concluded that Congress had exceeded its
authority.400 The standard applied in Shelby County—that “current
burdens” must be justified by “current needs”401—makes the point.
The metrics for racial discrimination must be grounded in the present;
a formula tethered to the past is presumptively irrational.402
By training so much of its attention on the passage of time, the
Court overlooked the more meaningful question of whether the
provision was still performing according to its original purpose, which
was to block (reconstituted) voting discrimination in the worstoffending jurisdictions. In 1965, the Act targeted areas with low
registration rates and the use of discriminatory tests or devices
because at the time they were the most relevant symptoms of the
more systemic problem. To return to our human disease analogy, the
Court’s error was to treat these symptoms as if they were the malady
itself—the rash, rather than the underlying metastatic disease. Had
the Court understood the constitutional inquiry differently, by
concentrating instead on the persistence of adaptive discrimination, it
might have realized the reasonableness of Congress’s decision to
reauthorize the coverage provision. Instead, the Court’s framing of
the constitutional requirement reduced voting discrimination to its
constituent parts, rather than conceiving it as a whole system that
mutates over time.
The Shelby County decision was enormously consequential. By
striking down the coverage provision, the Court disabled the only
mechanism that had constrained voting discrimination before it could
take root. Within hours of the decision, the state of Texas and other
formerly covered areas announced their plans to reinstate measures
that had been previously blocked.403 These measures included photo

400. Id. at 2631.
401. Id. at 2627, 2629.
402. Id. at 2629 (“Congress . . . must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a
basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.”).
403. See, e.g., Sahil Kapur, Texas Advances Voter ID Law After Supreme Court Strikes
Down Voting Rights Act, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 25, 2013), http://talkingpointsmemo
.com/dc/texas-advances-voter-id-law-after-supreme-court-strikes-down-voting-rights-act
[http://perma.cc/2BKD-25YJ]. See generally NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, STATEWIDE AND
LOCAL RESPONSES TO THE SUPREME COURT’S VOTING RIGHTS ACT DECISION
(2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/States%20and%20Localities%27
%20Responses%20to%20Shelby%20County%2C%20Alabama%20v.%20Holder%20as
%20of%202.18.2015.pdf [perma.cc/ZB8C-YGB2] (documenting voting discrimination by
formerly covered jurisdictions); Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Protecting Voting
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identification laws, some of which apparently were designed to dilute
the minority vote.404 By some accounts, the states’ use of these laws
skewed the outcome of the 2014 midterm elections.405
Shelby County, Dowell, and Freeman indicate how time
considerations influence race jurisprudence in constitutional doctrine.
Time-based justifications for terminating remedial measures are now
so deeply engrained in our constitutional jurisprudence that we take
them for granted. Indeed, time considerations were present even in
Grutter v. Bollinger,406 the Court’s only equal protection decision
squarely to uphold a race-conscious affirmative action plan.407 At the

Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928 (2013) (discussing the
impact that the loss of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act has had on voting rights).
404. See Ross, supra note 107, at 380 (“Most tellingly, officials who supported voter ID
laws or laws restricting early voting as purported anti-fraud measures recently either
admitted that these laws in fact served racially discriminatory purposes or were exposed as
purposefully callous to the laws’ discriminatory effects.”). Assertions that photo ID laws
are designed to reduce voting fraud appear pretextual, given that in-person fraud is nearly
non-existent. On the other hand, voting fraud by absentee ballot is far more common,
although state legislators have been reluctant to address it. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Why
Voter ID Laws Aren’t Really About Fraud, PBS: FRONTLINE (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/why-voter-id-laws-arent-really-about-fraud/
[https://perma.cc/9WMH-HVWG] (observing that “[a]bsentee voters tend to be older and
whiter than in-person voters” and describing state legislators’ reluctance to address fraud).
405. See BEN JEALOUS & RYAN P. HAYGOOD, THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE VOTE:
VOTER SUPPRESSION EFFORTS IN FIVE STATES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE 2014
MIDTERM ELECTIONS 1 (2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads
/2014/12/VoterSupression-report-Dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRB7-NBBM] (“While
the precise impact of strict voting laws on the results of the 2014 midterm elections is still
unknown, it is clear that the number of people predicted to face increased difficulties in
voting during this election either approaches or exceeds the margins of victory for
competitive statewide races.”). Jealous and Haygood’s 2014 report “highlights the
decreases in turnout [in the 2014 elections, as compared to] previous midterm elections in
the three states—Texas, Alabama, and Virginia—that implemented [voter ID] laws for the
first time in 2014.” Id. at 2; cf. Ingraham, supra note 57 (discussing conclusions drawn by a
political science working paper documenting “substantial drops in turnout for minorities
under strict voter ID laws” that were passed in the wake of the 2008 presidential election).
But see Lynn Bonner, Democrats up in NC’s Early-Voting Turnout, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Oct. 27, 2014, 10:42 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article10109558.html [https://perma.cc/8SLK-3JWT] (noting the “spike” in earlyvoting turnout in North Carolina during the 2014 elections).
406. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
407. Id. at 328. Grutter was the first U.S. Supreme Court case since Bakke to address
race-conscious admissions in higher education. See id. at 314 (describing Bakke as “this
Court’s most recent ruling on the use of race in university admissions”). The Court in
Bakke struck down the University of California at Davis’s consideration of race. 438 U.S.
265, 320 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). However, Justice Powell separately concluded that
a diversity-based admissions policy could survive constitutional review if it was
appropriately narrowly tailored. Id. at 311–12.
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close of her majority opinion upholding a law school’s narrow use of
race in admissions, Justice O’Connor intimated that affirmative action
may no longer be necessary “in 25 years.”408 This reference led some
of the dissenting Justices and other commentators to assume that the
Court had set an expiration date for race-conscious student admission
policies.409
Each of these cases illustrates how the Court’s misplaced focus
on time disguises discrimination’s adaptive dimensions.410 Only causes
and effects that are knowable and neatly unfold within discernible
periods count in the equal protection calculus. Causes and effects that
are too remote in time are beyond constitutional remedy.
III. WHAT CAN LAW DO?
The previous Part discussed the problems with constitutional
doctrine and the Court’s cognizance of adaptive discrimination for a
brief period following Brown. The discussion in Part II also examined
law’s subsequent shift to a time-based narrative that weakened the
constitutional justification for remedial measures. This Part asks
what, if anything, law can do. It returns to the racial tragedy involving
the fatal shooting of an unarmed black teenager by the police in the
beginning of this Article. Section III.A addresses the question of
whether progress is achievable given the nature of adaptive
discrimination. Section III.B proposes changes to constitutional law
that would enable the creation of adaptive enforcement methods.
Section III.B outlines a more innovative, dynamic enforcement
mechanism—one
that
involves
courts,
legislatures,
and
communities—to curb adaptive discrimination.

408. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”); see also
Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 550–54
(discussing Justice O’Connor’s use of time in Grutter as reflecting a desire to “structure a
constitutional transition period” to a “constitutionally preferable state of affairs” in which
race-conscious admissions are no longer necessary).
409. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court
suggests a possible 25-year limitation on the Law School’s current program.”).
410. See Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action,
79 TEX. L. REV. 643, 647 (2001).
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A. Is Racial Progress Possible?
David Luban theorizes that all “[l]egal argument is a struggle for
the privilege of recounting the past.”411 In the area of race, however,
legal argument also requires space for narratives that allow us to
“name our reality.”412 Existing constitutional doctrine demands that
we see racial discrimination as narrow, siloed, and time limited.
Accordingly, it looks past the systemic, dynamic, and regenerative
effects of disbanded government policies and the private choices that
such policies have enabled.
All of this raises an obvious question, which is whether law can
do anything. This question naturally flows from the very premise of
adaptive discrimination—that public and private actors reengineer
racially subordinating schemes that evade law, the effects of which
persist through social norms and practices that look past the resulting
racial disadvantage. Previous sections also explored the linear
assumptions that are embedded in constitutional doctrine, which has
curbed judicial and legislative remedies and affirmative action
policies that sought to address pervasive racial inequality. Therefore,
one might reasonably ask whether I have too much faith in the power
of law (and in the willingness of those entrusted to implement it) as a
tool for advancing racial justice.
I vacillate between optimism and pessimism about the
possibilities for law-based reform.413 For this reason, this Article has
carefully suggested that adaptive discrimination may be “curbed,”
rather than “remedied.” I use this distinction to convey some
ambivalence about our ability to dislodge racial subordination and the
utility of law as a means for undoing racial caste. Here I am
channeling Professor Derrick Bell, who regarded the search for racial
progress as something akin to a fool’s errand.414 Bell contended that
411. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2152, 2152 (1989).
412. See Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1336.
413. See generally id. at 1385–86 (discussing the “dilemma” presented to racial
reformers by relying on liberal rights-based reform).
414. See Bell, supra note 23, at 79 (“Black people will never gain full equality in this
country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than
temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial
patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance.”); cf. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT
THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 13–14 (1992) (“For too long,
we have worked for substantive reform, then settled for weakly worded and poorly
enforced legislation, indeterminate judicial decisions, token government positions, even
holidays.”). David Luban has also echoed this view. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 411, at
2152.
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the centuries-deep evidence of black oppression indicates that blacks
will be forever consigned to a permanent, subordinate status.415 He
resisted the notion that racial struggle should be conceived as a quest
for lasting progress. Instead, he urged that the purpose of struggle is
to find meaning in the practice of resistance.416 As Bell conceived it,
however, achieving that meaning requires abandoning the futile
search for permanent equality, which he described as “more illusory
than real.”417
I agree with Bell that the long trajectory of racial subordination
makes it impossible to have inordinate faith in the legal system.418
However, I part ways with him on the view that racial progress over
the long term is a lost cause and that the use of “law”—in the form of
courts who enforce it, legal actors who implement it, and doctrine
itself—for this purpose is senseless. While racial disadvantage is
persistent and very real, we cannot credibly say that we have not
made any progress.419 Nor can we afford to sideline courts in this
project.420 Indeed, if we are to make meaningful headway, we must be
able to draw on all instruments of law, including the courts,
legislatures, elected officials, and, of course, the people themselves.421
To state the obvious, not so long ago it was unimaginable that we
would have a black president. Three-hundred years ago, it was likely
inconceivable that slavery would eventually be declared
unconstitutional. One-hundred years ago, few would have expected
the Supreme Court to strike down de jure segregation. None of this
just “happened,” of course. Progress unfolded through the
415. See Bell, supra note 23, at 79 (describing the permanence of black inequality as “a
hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies”).
416. BELL, supra note 414, at 198 (discussing the search for “meaning” as the real
“success” in racial struggle).
417. Id. at 13.
418. See Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1349.
419. Id. at 1378 (“[D]espite these disparate results, it would be absurd to suggest that
no benefits came from these formal reforms, especially in regard to racial policies, such as
segregation, that were partly material but largely symbolic.”).
420. For a contextualized analysis of the role of law as a tool for racial justice, see
generally id. at 1349–70 (discussing the pragmatic use of legal rights). Aspects of this
Article also raise fundamental questions about the power of law to counter “[w]hite race
consciousness” and whether the rule of law is capable of embracing the framework of
adaptive discrimination when such an embrace necessarily challenges the very ideological
system upon which law is based. Id. at 1375. A fuller exploration of these questions,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
421. School desegregation programs have achieved some success through systemic
enforcement. See James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School
Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1465–75, 1523 (1990).
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generations due to resistance by untold numbers of people pushing to
change laws and behavior in large and small ways. Thus, to make
another crucial point, I do not harbor any illusions that change
originates with law. Although a deeper exploration of these points is
beyond the scope of this Article, social movements are also essential
for legal reform.422
At bottom, this Article takes the view that racial progress is
possible. But progress, like discrimination, ebbs and flows over time.
Therefore, we need to extend our time horizons in evaluating our
relative success.423 As a practical matter, this means that law should
treat racial discrimination as an endemic and complex problem that
requires systemic, dynamic, and strategic responses and, just as
importantly, indefinite vigilance.424 More fundamentally, we have to
accept that the improvements we seek now may not bear fruit until
we are long gone.
We can analogize systemic racial inequality to climate change to
help illustrate the point.425 The seeds of our current climatic activity
were planted long ago, but the effects in many ways are only now
becoming apparent.426 As with climate change, it will take significant
time to reengineer and reconstruct our racial system. To do this, we
need more innovative enforcement mechanisms that are as
continuous, responsive, and fluid as the problem itself. Although a
complete exploration of these points is beyond the scope of this
Article, the next Section sketches the framework for this enterprise
and the contours of what it might look like.
B.

Creating an Ecosystem for Racial Equality

How might we advance an adaptive enforcement mechanism to
create an ecosystem for racial equality in places like Ferguson,
Missouri and the St. Louis metropolitan area? Such an expansive

422. See generally, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2001) (“The modern meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause owes much more to the power and norms of the civil rights
and women's liberation movements than to the original intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment's framers.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the
Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162)).
423. Cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 406–07 (2011) (describing
the mind’s limited capacity to process time in making decisions).
424. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1382 (discussing the strategic importance of
making demands that lie within the institutional logic of the dominant discourse).
425. See Powell, supra note 227, at 797–98 (analogizing to climate change).
426. See Sterman, Climate Change, supra note 44, at 811–12.
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project would necessarily involve the investment of federal, state, and
local government resources and the attention of courts and
legislatures, as well as individuals working within and across affected
communities.427 As discussed earlier in this Article, each of these
constituencies has had a hand in the creation of adaptive
discrimination over a period of generations. Each must be involved in
curbing its operation.
This enterprise neither begins nor ends with constitutional law,
as it first requires the willingness of each of the above actors to
commit to the problem itself. This, of course, presents its own set of
daunting political and practical problems. However, in key respects,
constitutional law is also a barrier. It is an impediment to affirmative
litigation against governmental actors insofar as it requires a specific
showing of racially discriminatory intent. And it limits both the
authority of federal courts to redress discrimination that has persisted
through time and the power of Congress to target adaptive
discrimination through legislation that burdens states and local
jurisdictions. Thus, constitutional law both shields adaptive
discrimination from the efforts of those who seek to eradicate racial
inequality and provides those who champion such inequality with a
sword against remedial measures that seek to address it, particularly
at the federal level. This is a problem given that federal institutions
and resources will need to be involved in this enterprise.
The subsections below suggest ideas for navigating some of this
terrain, and end by focusing on strategies that can be enforced by
communities at the state and local level—largely free of the
constitutional constraints identified earlier. I also briefly discuss some
of the barriers to their implementation.
1. Clearing the Path to Systemic Change
As the previous Sections discussed, constitutional law denies
federal courts, Congress, and proponents of voluntary affirmative
action the flexibility to respond to adaptive discrimination.428 This
subsection proposes changes that would help clear the path for more
427. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality’s Frontiers: How Congress’s Section 5 Power Can
Secure Transformative Equality (as Justice Ginsburg Illustrates in Coleman), 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 267, 269 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1138_rwjspe3e.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5Y4M-T5CB] (observing that “the interplay among social movements, democratic bodies,
and courts” works together to create “new approaches to enforcing equality”).
428. See Rich, supra note 14, at 238 (discussing the benefits of divergence between
constitutional and statutory law).
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systemic reform in ways that align with the respective institutional
capabilities of these various actors.
For example, we can readily conclude that courts cannot
realistically (or even appropriately) manage discrimination’s systemic
and dynamic nature. In the context of the problems identified in this
Article, courts are better suited for resolving challenges to specific
institutional practices that foster racial inequality.429 Legislatures and
government agencies, on the other hand, can study discrimination’s
dynamic qualities and offer solutions that account for its complexity.
The preclearance mechanism in the Voting Rights Act is a good
example of an effective strategy and how it might work using the
courts and the executive branch in a complementary enforcement
framework. Though it has been disabled by the Court in Shelby
County, Congress could still pass legislation that revives the provision
using a different coverage formula. Moreover, there are no federal
constitutional barriers for state legislatures to adopt the same kind of
preclearance mechanism for their own state laws. However, as the
federal preclearance provision itself shows, there are clear practical
problems with relying on state legislatures to police themselves,
especially (for reasons already discussed) with regard to racial
discrimination.
As discussed throughout this Article, the Court’s express and
implicit use of time as a sword against efforts to redress racial
inequality is a continuing problem. The assumption that
discrimination expires, or is no longer constitutionally cognizable,
with the passage of time has led the Court to conclude that “de facto”
racial segregation in public schools is beyond judicial remedy, to
decide that Congress lacked constitutional authority to renew the
Voting Rights Act’s preclearance formula, and to observe that
diversity-based affirmative action may no longer be necessary in
twenty-five years. The same assumptions about time underlie the
Court’s determination that efforts to redress “societal
discrimination”—which is “ageless in its reach into the past”430—
cannot be the basis for voluntary, race-specific affirmative action in

429. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 555 (2006) (describing court orders as “one
of the primary vehicles by which litigation has driven social change” and institutional
reform).
430. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.).
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higher education and government contracting or voluntary
integration programs in K-12 public schools.
Of course, time has been a factor even in constitutional decisions
that favor an adaptive framework. Recall that the Court’s decision in
Green invoked time in deciding that it was too soon to conclude that
the school board had disestablished its dual system.431 And, in
Katzenbach, the Court determined that Congress could
constitutionally shift the advantages of “time and inertia” from the
“perpetrators of evil” to its “victims.”432
Still, for reasons already discussed, it is risky to legitimize time as
a factor in adjudicating racial discrimination. Because discrimination
mutates, it is easier to elude detection, which means that
discrimination is likely to persist over some period. As demonstrated
in the constitutional cases discussed earlier, accepting time as a
consideration invites the possibility that it will be used to invalidate
policies and practices that promote racial equality. Therefore, this
Article calls for courts to abandon time, both as an explicit and
implicit criterion, when judging the necessity of continuing
discrimination remedies.
The use of time as a factor in constitutional adjudication,
however, will be difficult to overcome as long as intent is the standard
and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that present inequality is
“traceable” to prior intent. The passage of time naturally makes it
harder for the plaintiff to demonstrate (and a court to discern) an
earlier decisionmaker’s motivation, as recollections of prior events
dim and records documenting such proof are lost.
Ideally, we would abandon racial intent.433 But, short of that
scenario, we might look to Green for a possible solution. In Green, the
Court shifted the burden to the school board to prove that it had
eliminated “root and branch” the “vestiges” of its prior conduct.434 As
the Court observed in Freeman v. Pitts, the “school district bears the
burden of showing that any current racial imbalance is not traceable
in a proximate way to [a] prior constitutional violation.”435

431. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
432. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
433. For an explanation of how an intent-free standard would work in the context of
school integration, we can look to Justice Powell’s concurrence in Keyes v. School District
Number 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217–53 (1973).
434. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
435. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016)

1308

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

Of course, as discussed earlier, Freeman also unhelpfully
concluded that white flight was not proximately related to past
intentional discrimination,436 which limits its practical utility here.
Nevertheless, the fact that the school board bears the burden of proof
in desegregation cases changes the constitutional conversation by
giving plaintiffs leverage to exact changes to school board practices
that perpetuate racial inequality. The rebuttable presumption that
continuing racial “imbalance” is connected to unconstitutional
discrimination by the school district allows plaintiffs to negotiate
changes to educational practices that harm black students and to
require school districts to provide black students with more
educational resources.437
Ellen Katz describes comparable dynamics in the analogous
context of Section 5’s preclearance model. Placing the burden on the
defendant, rather than on the plaintiff, creates “an affirmative tool of
governance”438 that, at least prior to Shelby County, enabled plaintiffs
to challenge voting policies and practices that had a discriminatory
impact while insulating government officials from some of the
political pressures they might otherwise face not to “cave” to
plaintiffs’ demands.439 An adaptive framework could apply the same
burden to any public institution with a history of intentional racial
discrimination. That institution would be under an affirmative
obligation to show that the challenged practice was not traceable to
its prior unconstitutional conduct. The benefit of this approach is that
it hews reasonably closely to constitutional precedent. The
disadvantage is that it remains tethered to findings of racial intent.
Moreover, any remedies would be confined to the particular
institution itself.
The next subsection sketches components of an adaptive
framework that would engage state legislatures, state courts, and state
and local communities in this project.

436. Id. at 494–95.
437. See Holley-Walker, supra note 38, at 432–42 (discussing the educational benefits
of integrated schools and recent developments in school desegregation cases).
438. See Ellen D. Katz, South Carolina’s “Evolutionary Process”, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 55, 64 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Katz113-Colum.-L-Rev.-Sidebar-55.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FLE-K3VF].
439. Id. (“[S]ection 5 shaped the development of a less burdensome policy without
forcing state officials to spend political capital convincing the skeptical or hostile of
anything beyond the measure’s compliance with federal law.”).
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2. Enforcement Strategies for Communities
This subsection explores a set of interactive, dynamic strategies
that could be implemented at the local and regional level.440 Because
states have plenary powers over municipalities, they could require
localities to comply with these enforcement mechanisms.441 The
obvious drawback of course is that recalcitrant states could reject
these mechanisms altogether, leaving localities that were otherwise
receptive to such initiatives with minimal recourse.442 Indeed, as
discussed throughout this Article, there is good reason to be
concerned about whether states with a recividist history of racial
discrimination would agree to racial justice initiatives at the local
level. On the other hand, enforcement against states would require
some federal intervention and could potentially raise some of the
federal constitutional problems discussed in previous sections.443
Thus, any proposal would have to be evaluated and weighed in light
of these advantages and disadvantages.
The mechanism that I contemplate here draws on a proposal by
R.A. Lenhardt to use “race audits” to identify local policies and
practices that perpetuate racial inequality.444 Again, we can look to
the preclearance provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as a model
for determining which jurisdictions would be subject to a race audit.
As discussed above, the Act required certain jurisdictions with a
history of persistent racial discrimination to submit any proposed
voting changes for federal review. Under my framework, race audits
would be performed in local jurisdictions and metropolitan areas that
are symptomatic of adaptive discrimination. These symptoms might
440. Cf. R.A. Lenhardt, Localities as Equality Innovators, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 265,
270–75 (2011) (exploring the potential for equality innovation at the local level).
441. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (concluding that
localities are creatures of the state and are subject to the state’s plenary power and
authority).
442. See, e.g., New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825
So. 2d 1098, 1107–08 (La. 2002) (holding that state law barred local governments from
establishing a minimum wage that applied to private employers).
443. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation after Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1437–38 (2013) (discussing “heated [scholarly and political] debate”
about the role of federal courts in institutional reform); David Schoenbrod, The Immortality
of Equitable Balancing, 96 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 17, 18 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview
.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/schoenbrod.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZV8A-CNRM]
(arguing that judicial discretion “does no violence to legislative policy choices”).
444. See R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1534 (2011); see also
Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257,
1260–64 (1991) (providing a history of local policies contributing to racial inequality).
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include, for example, high degrees of residential and public school
segregation (intra- as well as interdistrict) and aggressive policing
practices that target marginalized racial communities. How the
jurisdiction allocates public resources and services and whether it
concentrates the least desirable public facilities in distressed minority
neighborhoods or towns would also be relevant.
Localities and metropolitan regions that display these symptoms
would be subject to a race audit. As conceptualized by Lenhardt, the
audit team would bring together professionals and academics trained
in the audit function, as well as community organizers and other
affected individuals.445 This team would be tasked with uncovering
practices that have fostered racial inequality and with making
recommendations for curbing those practices’ present effects.
Proposed government policies would also be evaluated for their racial
impact. An “audit board” would design remedial measures that would
take appropriate account of the adaptive nature of the targeted
problems.446 Because adaptive discrimination often crosses
jurisdictional boundaries, ideally the audit board would consist of
both local officials and officials from the surrounding metropolitan
area.447
A court consisting of appointed judges, which was specially
constituted to examine and enforce the audit team’s
recommendations, would order remedies tailored to curb adaptive
discrimination and preemptively bar implementation of other harmful
measures. Because an adaptive enforcement model requires an active
monitoring mechanism, the court’s jurisdiction would be indefinite,
rather than time limited, and would span the full range of racially
impacted systems. Further, the court would be empowered to take
account of time delays in evaluating a policy or program’s relative
success. The model contemplates that the court and the audit team
would periodically revisit any solutions to reevaluate their
effectiveness.

445. This form of community engagement could provide a democratic forum for local
citizenry to exercise its voice and power around consequential matters of race. See
Eskridge, supra note 422, at 419 (discussing social movement theory in relationship to
law).
446. See generally, e.g., Sterman, Climate Change, supra note 44 (calling for an
interdisciplinary approach to system dynamics).
447. For one model of how this might work, see GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:
BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 61–63 (2001) (discussing the use
of regional legislatures).
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A number of questions about the logistics of this enforcement
system would have to be sorted out. One practical question is whether
courts would have the power to enjoin local officials who refused to
cooperate or comply with a race audit. Another question is whether
localities would have recourse to appeal the orders of the specially
constituted court. The audit team itself would also have to be
appropriately staffed and monitored, which raises budgetary
implications. Other political questions arise about how to constitute
the audit board and its governance structure.
How might we apply this framework to Ferguson? The account
of adaptive discrimination in Ferguson and the surrounding St. Louis
region described in Section I.B offers an example of what an audit
team might uncover, as well as clues for diagnosing the reasons for
persistent racial inequality in the town and the surrounding areas.448
Adaptive enforcement measures might include a system of
metropolitan zoning that would allow affordable housing to be sited
throughout the region. Policies could be designed to address the
intergenerational impact of poverty, such as intensive educational
programs for both parents and children and various forms of funding
to improve rates of homeownership among marginalized
communities. The audit team could also make recommendations to
improve relationships between the black community and the police,
including the elimination of ticketing practices that target black
residents. The monitoring mechanisms would have to be deployed to
respond to any feedback effects that result from these policies. For
example, we might imagine Ferguson shifting to new funding sources
that continue to disadvantage the black community. The audit team,
the board, and the court would have to remain active and alert to
these kinds of adaptive strategies.
3. The Challenges of a Systemic Approach
The framework described above has clear limitations that are
inherent to systemic approaches.449 For example, enforcement likely
448. Indeed, a commission established to study the problems in Ferguson has already
convened and issued a report. FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A
PATH TOWARD RACIAL EQUITY (2015), http://3680or2khmk3bzkp33juiea1.wpengine
.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/101415_FergusonCommissionReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NC4T-NAP7].
449. See David A. Graham, What Can the New Ferguson Report Achieve?, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/what-can-the
-new-ferguson-report-achieve/405205/ [https://perma.cc/BZ3L-RNAE] (identifying political
and practical problems with the implementation of systemic solutions).
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would have to be carried out in ways that track institutional and
organizational structures and processes, including matters of funding,
implementation, and management. As a result, enforcement itself
runs the risk of replicating the very problems that an adaptive
framework seeks to address. Although an enforcement framework
could require collaboration among and between government officials
and private citizens to avoid some pitfalls, political and practical
challenges are inevitable.
In addition, law itself could use some cultural and professional
reorientation in its approach to racial discrimination. Lawyers are
trained to atomize problems—to break them down into their specific
components according to relevant standards of proof and to align
proposed remedies with available legal theories. Thus, law does not
offer a “one-stop shop” for addressing racial discrimination’s systemic
fluidity. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what that would look like. This
is another reason why ongoing community engagement and feedback
and continuing grassroots pressure on legal and political actors would
be crucial to the success of an adaptive enforcement mechanism.
Additional challenges might include a lack of resources and
funding at the state and local level,450 requiring federal support and
intervention. Moreover, the entities that comprise the race audit team
could be readily captured by political interests or compromised by the
very white privilege norms, racialized class ideologies, and implicit
racial bias I discussed earlier. It is also possible that those subject to
the enforcement mechanism would simply decide to exit the new
order altogether by moving to another jurisdiction or reconstituting
new communities under new sets of laws and rules.451 Thus, while the
enforcement mechanism described here would allow useful and
innovative techniques for addressing adaptive discrimination,
additional work would have to be done to sort out its logistics and to
reorient its participants on how to maximize its effectiveness.

450. But see Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 998 (1991)
(“The higher costs that attend lobbying at the state level likely mean that fewer groups
concerned with parochial issues will have a sufficient advantage to dominate at that
level.”).
451. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62
UCLA L. REV. 364, 377 (2015) (observing that homeowner associations helped to
“effectively replace[]” racial zoning laws after they were struck down).
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CONCLUSION
We have made significant racial progress in this country. And
yet, daunting problems remain. This Article has argued that these
problems are a function of racial discrimination that is more complex
than our limited cognitive models and constitutional doctrine allow
and that public and private actors have been complicit in the creation
and maintenance of our racially compromised systems. Our linear,
time-centered approaches to addressing racial discrimination are
destined to fail us, as they have again and again.
Thus, our best hope for promoting racial justice is to embrace the
precepts of adaptive discrimination. We must change the
constitutional standards that prevent us from addressing it, and we
must develop cross-institutional enforcement models that are more
responsive to racial discrimination’s systemic and dynamic nature.
Finally, we must accept that the quest for racial equality and freedom
may continue for some time and that such a quest requires persistence
and vigilance through the generations.

